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A requiem for the USA Is small shareholder monitoring effective?

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  • Strickland, Deon
  • Wiles, Kenneth W.
  • Zenner, Marc
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VBX-3VWPP49-C/2/e645ef0b97e0f82af15f3a2305680113
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Economics.

    Volume (Year): 40 (1996)
    Issue (Month): 2 (February)
    Pages: 319-338

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:40:y:1996:i:2:p:319-338

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576

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    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Holderness, Clifford G. & Sheehan, Dennis P., 1985. "Raiders or saviors? The evidence on six controversial investors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 555-555, December.
    2. Rosenstein, Stuart & Wyatt, Jeffrey G., 1990. "Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 175-191, August.
    3. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 351.
    4. Brickley, James A. & Lease, Ronald C. & Smith, Clifford Jr., 1988. "Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 267-291, January.
    5. Brickley, James A & James, Christopher M, 1987. "The Takeover Market, Corporate Board Composition, and Ownership Structure: The Case of Banking," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 161-80, April.
    6. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    7. Comment, Robert & Schwert, G. William, 1995. "Poison or placebo? Evidence on the deterrence and wealth effects of modern antitakeover measures," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 3-43, September.
    8. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-64, April.
    9. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-38, May.
    10. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
    11. Mikkelson, Wayne H. & Ruback, Richard S., 1985. "An empirical analysis of the interfirm equity investment process," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 523-553, December.
    12. Martin, Kenneth J & McConnell, John J, 1991. " Corporate Performance, Corporate Takeovers, and Management Turnover," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(2), pages 671-87, June.
    13. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring.
    14. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-88, June.
    15. Pound, John, 1988. "Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 237-265, January.
    16. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January.
    17. Brous, Peter A. & Kini, Omesh, 1993. "A reexamination of analysts' earnings forecasts for takeover targets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 201-225, April.
    18. Oliver D. Hart, 1983. "The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 366-382, Autumn.
    19. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 110.
    20. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    21. Sunil Wahal & Kenneth W. Wiles & Marc Zenner, 1995. "Who Opts Out of State Antitakeover Protection?: The Case of Pennsylvania's SB 1310," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 24(3), Fall.
    22. Ryngaert, Michael, 1988. "The effect of poison pill securities on shareholder wealth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 377-417, January.
    23. Agrawal, Anup & Mandelker, Gershon N., 1990. "Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(02), pages 143-161, June.
    24. Shivdasani, Anil, 1993. "Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 167-198, April.
    25. Malatesta, Paul H. & Walkling, Ralph A., 1988. "Poison pill securities : Stockholder wealth, profitability, and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 347-376, January.
    26. Lambert, Richard A. & Larcker, David F., 1985. "Golden parachutes, executive decision-making, and shareholder wealth," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 179-203, April.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:
    1. Roberta Romano, 2002. "Does Confidential Proxy Voting Matter?," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm300, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Feb 2003.
    2. Su Han Chan & Wai Kin Leung & Ko Wang, 1998. "Institutional Investment in REITs: Evidence and Implications," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 16(3), pages 357-374.
    3. Choi, Stephen J., 2000. "Proxy Issue Proposals: Impact of the 1992 Proxy SEC Proxy Reforms," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt6g6118kk, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    4. Nicole Boyson & Robert Mooradian, 2011. "Corporate governance and hedge fund activism," Review of Derivatives Research, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 169-204, July.
    5. Roberta Romano, 2002. "Does Confidential Proxy Voting Matter?," NBER Working Papers 9126, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Gillan, Stuart L. & Starks, Laura T., 2002. "Institutional Investors, Corporate Ownership, and Corporate Governance: Global Perspectives," Working Paper Series UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    7. Girard, Carine, 2000. "Shareholders' activism. A comparison between the United Kingdom and France," Working Papers CREGO 1001201, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    8. Carine Girard, 2004. "L’incidence de l’activisme actionnarial sur les mécanismes de gouvernance:le cas français," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 7(3), pages 91-116, September.
    9. Abe Jong & Gerard Mertens & Peter Roosenboom, 2006. "Shareholders’ Voting at General Meetings: Evidence from the Netherlands," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 353-380, November.
    10. Bilge Yilmaz, . "Strategic Voting and Proxy Contests," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 05-00, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    11. Maug, Ernst & Rydqvist, Kristian, 2004. "Do Shareholders vote Strategically? Evidence on the Advisory Role of Annual General Meetings," CEPR Discussion Papers 4192, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Steiger, Max, 1998. "Institutionelle Investoren und Corporate Governance: Eine empirische Analyse," ZEW Dokumentationen 98-05, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    13. Karpoff, Jonathan M. & Malatesta, Paul H. & Walkling, Ralph A., 1996. "Corporate governance and shareholder initiatives: Empirical evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 365-395, November.
    14. Johnson, Marilyn F. & Nelson, Karen K. & Shackell, Margaret B., 2001. "An Empirical Analysis of the SEC's 1992 Proxy Reforms on Executive Compensation," Research Papers 1679, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    15. Romano, Roberta, 2002. "Does Confidential Proxy Voting Matter?," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt9z88z4th, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    16. Bilge Yilmaz, . "Strategic Voting and Proxy Contests," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 5-00, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.

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