IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jfinec/v40y1996i2p319-338.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A requiem for the USA Is small shareholder monitoring effective?

Author

Listed:
  • Strickland, Deon
  • Wiles, Kenneth W.
  • Zenner, Marc

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Strickland, Deon & Wiles, Kenneth W. & Zenner, Marc, 1996. "A requiem for the USA Is small shareholder monitoring effective?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 319-338, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:40:y:1996:i:2:p:319-338
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0304-405X(95)00849-A
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Agrawal, Anup & Mandelker, Gershon N., 1990. "Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(2), pages 143-161, June.
    2. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January.
    3. Comment, Robert & Schwert, G. William, 1995. "Poison or placebo? Evidence on the deterrence and wealth effects of modern antitakeover measures," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 3-43, September.
    4. Oliver D. Hart, 1983. "The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 366-382, Autumn.
    5. Mikkelson, Wayne H. & Ruback, Richard S., 1985. "An empirical analysis of the interfirm equity investment process," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 523-553, December.
    6. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-838, May.
    7. Rosenstein, Stuart & Wyatt, Jeffrey G., 1990. "Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 175-191, August.
    8. Holderness, Clifford G. & Sheehan, Dennis P., 1985. "Raiders or saviors? The evidence on six controversial investors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 555-555, December.
    9. Easterbrook, Frank H, 1984. "Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(4), pages 650-659, September.
    10. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    11. Sunil Wahal & Kenneth W. Wiles & Marc Zenner, 1995. "Who Opts Out of State Antitakeover Protection?: The Case of Pennsylvania's SB 1310," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 24(3), Fall.
    12. Gordon, Lilli A & Pound, John, 1993. "Information, Ownership Structure, and Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Shareholder-Sponsored Corporate Governance Proposals," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(2), pages 697-718, June.
    13. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 110-110.
    14. Shivdasani, Anil, 1993. "Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 167-198, April.
    15. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-488, June.
    16. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    17. Lambert, Richard A. & Larcker, David F., 1985. "Golden parachutes, executive decision-making, and shareholder wealth," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 179-203, April.
    18. Jarrell, Gregg A. & Poulsen, Annette B., 1987. "Shark repellents and stock prices : The effects of antitakeover amendments since 1980," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 127-168, September.
    19. Martin, Kenneth J & McConnell, John J, 1991. "Corporate Performance, Corporate Takeovers, and Management Turnover," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(2), pages 671-687, June.
    20. Brickley, James A. & Lease, Ronald C. & Smith, Clifford Jr., 1988. "Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 267-291, January.
    21. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, 2010. "CEO Incentives—It's Not How Much You Pay, But How," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 22(1), pages 64-76, January.
    22. Pound, John, 1988. "Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 237-265, January.
    23. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-264, April.
    24. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    25. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 351-351.
    26. Michael S. Rozeff, 1982. "Growth, Beta And Agency Costs As Determinants Of Dividend Payout Ratios," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 5(3), pages 249-259, September.
    27. Brickley, James A & James, Christopher M, 1987. "The Takeover Market, Corporate Board Composition, and Ownership Structure: The Case of Banking," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 161-180, April.
    28. Malatesta, Paul H. & Walkling, Ralph A., 1988. "Poison pill securities : Stockholder wealth, profitability, and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 347-376, January.
    29. Brous, Peter A. & Kini, Omesh, 1993. "A reexamination of analysts' earnings forecasts for takeover targets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 201-225, April.
    30. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring.
    31. Ryngaert, Michael, 1988. "The effect of poison pill securities on shareholder wealth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 377-417, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Romano, Roberta, 2002. "Does Confidential Proxy Voting Matter?," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt9z88z4th, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    2. Muhammad Imran Nazir & Muhammad Zulfiqar & Muhammad Bilal Saeed & Yasir Habib, 2016. "The Influence of Board Characteristics on Shareholders Assessment of Risk for Small and Large Firms: Evidence from Pakistan," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 6(2), pages 596-606.
    3. Girard, Carine, 2000. "Shareholders' activism. A comparison between the United Kingdom and France," Working Papers CREGO 1001201, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    4. Su Han Chan & Wai Kin Leung & Ko Wang, 1998. "Institutional Investment in REITs: Evidence and Implications," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 16(3), pages 357-374.
    5. Choi, Stephen J., 2000. "Proxy Issue Proposals: Impact of the 1992 Proxy SEC Proxy Reforms," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt6g6118kk, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    6. Bilge Yilmaz, "undated". "Strategic Voting and Proxy Contests," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 5-00, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    7. Jang-Sup Shin, 2018. "The Subversion of Shareholder Democracy and the Rise of Hedge-Fund Activism," Working Papers Series 77, Institute for New Economic Thinking.
    8. Johnson, Marilyn F. & Nelson, Karen K. & Shackell, Margaret B., 2001. "An Empirical Analysis of the SEC's 1992 Proxy Reforms on Executive Compensation," Research Papers 1679, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    9. Rydqvist, Kristian & Maug, Ernst, 2004. "Do Shareholders vote Strategically? Evidence on the Advisory Role of Annual General Meetings," CEPR Discussion Papers 4192, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Bilge Yilmaz, "undated". "Strategic Voting and Proxy Contests," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 05-00, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    11. Klein, April, 1998. "Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 275-303, April.
    12. Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, 2002. "Institutional Investors, Corporate Ownership, and Corporate Governance: Global Perspectives," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2002-09, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    13. Matsusaka, John G. & Ozbas, Oguzhan & Yi, Irene, 2017. "Why Do Managers Fight Shareholder Proposals? Evidence from SEC No-Action Letter Decisions," Working Papers 262, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    14. Karpoff, Jonathan M. & Malatesta, Paul H. & Walkling, Ralph A., 1996. "Corporate governance and shareholder initiatives: Empirical evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 365-395, November.
    15. Steiger, Max, 1998. "Institutionelle Investoren und Corporate Governance: Eine empirische Analyse," ZEW Dokumentationen 98-05, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    16. Roberta Romano, 2002. "Does Confidential Proxy Voting Matter?," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm300, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Feb 2003.
    17. Nicole Boyson & Robert Mooradian, 2011. "Corporate governance and hedge fund activism," Review of Derivatives Research, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 169-204, July.
    18. Carine Girard, 2004. "L’incidence de l’activisme actionnarial sur les mécanismes de gouvernance:le cas français," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 7(3), pages 91-116, September.
    19. Souha Bouaziz Siala & Anis Jarboui, 2019. "The moderating effect of audit quality on the relation between shareholder activism and earnings management: Evidence from France," Contemporary Economics, University of Economics and Human Sciences in Warsaw., vol. 13(1), March.
    20. Denes, Matthew R. & Karpoff, Jonathan M. & McWilliams, Victoria B., 2017. "Thirty years of shareholder activism: A survey of empirical research," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 405-424.
    21. Abe Jong & Gerard Mertens & Peter Roosenboom, 2006. "Shareholders’ Voting at General Meetings: Evidence from the Netherlands," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 10(4), pages 353-380, November.
    22. Roberta Romano, 2002. "Does Confidential Proxy Voting Matter?," NBER Working Papers 9126, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    23. Jonathan Lewellen & Katharina Lewellen, 2022. "Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: The Incentive to Be Engaged," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 213-264, February.
    24. Szilagyi, P.G., 2007. "Corporate governance and the agency costs of debt and outside equity," Other publications TiSEM 9520d40a-224f-43a8-9bf9-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    2. Szilagyi, P.G., 2007. "Corporate governance and the agency costs of debt and outside equity," Other publications TiSEM 9520d40a-224f-43a8-9bf9-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Cotter, James F. & Shivdasani, Anil & Zenner, Marc, 1997. "Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 195-218, February.
    4. ATM Adnan & Nisar Ahmed, 2019. "The Transformation Of The Corporate Governance Model: A Literature Review," Copernican Journal of Finance & Accounting, Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika, vol. 8(3), pages 7-47.
    5. Noel O'Sullivan & Pauline Wong, 1999. "Board composition, ownership structure and hostile takeovers: some UK evidence," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(2), pages 139-155.
    6. Mehran, Hamid, 1995. "Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 163-184, June.
    7. Peter M Clarkson & Shams Pathan & Andrew Tellam, 2016. "Do private equity target firms exhibit less effectual governance structures?," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 41(2), pages 244-270, May.
    8. Becker, Bo & Cronqvist, Henrik & Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, 2011. "Estimating the Effects of Large Shareholders Using a Geographic Instrument," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(4), pages 907-942, August.
    9. Bradbury, Michael E. & Mak, Y. T., 2000. "Ownership structure, board composition and the adoption of charter takeover procedures," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 165-188, July.
    10. Noel O'Sullivan & Pauline Wong, 1998. "Internal versus External Control: An Analysis of Board Composition and Ownership in UK Takeovers," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 2(1), pages 17-35, March.
    11. Isabel Gutierrez & Jordi Surroca, 2014. "Revisiting corporate governance through the lens of the Spanish evidence," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 18(4), pages 989-1017, November.
    12. Prevost, Andrew K. & Rao, Ramesh P. & Hossain, Mahmud, 2002. "Determinants of board composition in New Zealand: a simultaneous equations approach," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 373-397, November.
    13. Moerland, Pieter W., 1995. "Alternative disciplinary mechanisms in different corporate systems," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-34, January.
    14. Martin Conyon & Annita Florou, 2002. "Top executive dismissal, ownership and corporate performance," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(4), pages 209-225.
    15. Booth, James R. & Cornett, Marcia Millon & Tehranian, Hassan, 2002. "Boards of directors, ownership, and regulation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(10), pages 1973-1996, October.
    16. John, Kose & Senbet, Lemma W., 1998. "Corporate governance and board effectiveness1," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 371-403, May.
    17. Robert L. Lippert & William T. Moore, 1994. "Compensation Contracts Of Chief Executive Officers: Determinants Of Pay-Performance Sensitivity," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 17(3), pages 321-332, September.
    18. Haan, Marco A. & Riyanto, Yohanes, 2006. "The effects of takeover threats on shareholders and firm value," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 45-68, January.
    19. Sokolyk, Tatyana, 2011. "The effects of antitakeover provisions on acquisition targets," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 612-627, June.
    20. Marc Goergen & Christine A. Mallin & Eve Mitleton-Kelly & Ahmed Al-Hawamdeh & Iris H-Y Chiu, 2010. "Corporate Governance and Complexity Theory," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13927.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:40:y:1996:i:2:p:319-338. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.