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Aggregate Accuracy under Majority Rule with Heterogeneous Cost Functions

Author

Listed:
  • Minoru Kitahara

    (Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo)

  • Yohei Sekiguchi

    (Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo)

Abstract

We investigate an election model with costly accuracy improvement by allowing heterogeneity in the cost functions. We find that the aggregate accuracy in large elections is characterized by the average value of the inverse of the second derivative at zero information.

Suggested Citation

  • Minoru Kitahara & Yohei Sekiguchi, 2006. "Aggregate Accuracy under Majority Rule with Heterogeneous Cost Functions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(25), pages 1-8.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-06d70001
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    4. Daniel Berend & Jacob Paroush, 1998. "When is Condorcet's Jury Theorem valid?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(4), pages 481-488.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    costly information acquisition;

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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