The Potential for Electricity Market Restructuring in Quebec
AbstractIn this paper we discuss the potential for future electricity market restructuring in Quebec. In particular, we consider the political economy of the abolishment of the Heritage Pool requirement, which caps wholesale prices. Its elimination is challenging since it would result in higher retail prices. However, if the extra revenue that would be earned from selling at the market price is properly redistributed, a majority of voters could benefit. We also examine the possibility of establishing a competitive wholesale market. The usual model of forced divestiture may not lead to a competitive outcome since most of Quebec's electricity is produced at large hydroelectric complexes cascaded on a few individual river systems. Consequently, Quebec might consider adopting the approach taken by Norway and join an expanded production pool.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Toronto Press in its journal Canadian Public Policy.
Volume (Year): 33 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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Web page: http://economics.ca/cpp/
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