Rent Dissipation Through Electricity Prices of Publicly-Owned Utilities
AbstractEconomists have long advised pricing electricity at marginal cost. In the case of public utilities producing from hydraulic sources, this would ordinarily generate a rent that could be used to finance public projects or to lower taxes. But marginal cost pricing by public utilities is rarely observed in practice, the potential rent being dissipated through low electricity prices. This paper offers an explanation of such a phenomenon by using a public choice model. It is shown that if (i) government revenues are raised through proportional taxes, (ii) median income is less than mean income, and (iii) the share of a consumer's spending on electricity decreases with income, then the price resulting from a majority rule and universal voting is below marginal cost. Its level can be determined by a modified Ramsey rule which takes into account the population income distribution. When a fixed subscription fee is charged to the consumers, this fee is set as low as possible, generally reflecting fixed distribution costs exclusively. It is also shown that publicly-owned utilities must be able to exploit a resource rent in order to break even, suggesting that utilities operating under constant or increasing returns to scale would normally be private or be privatized in the future. Empirical evidence of these results are obtained from the observation of the Canadian electric industry in general and of the pricing policies of Hydro-Qu‚bec, one of the major Canadian public utilities, in particular.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université Laval - Département d'économique in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 9512.
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Jean-Thomas Bernard & Michel Roland, 1997. "Rent Dissipation through Electricity Prices of Publicly Owned Utilities," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(4), pages 1204-19, November.
- Bernard, J.T. & Roland, M., 1995. "Rent Dissipation Through Electricity Prices of Publicly-Owned Utilities," Papers 9512, Laval - Recherche en Energie.
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
- H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
- Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
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- Bernard, Jean-Thomas, 1999.
"Le marché québécois de l’électricité : rétrospective et voies de l’avenir,"
Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 75(4), pages 673-694, dÃ©cembre.
- Bernard, Jean-Thomas, 1999. "Le marché québécois de l'électricité: rétrospective et voies de l'avenir," Cahiers de recherche 9912, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
- C. Robert Clark & Andrew Leach, 2007. "The Potential for Electricity Market Restructuring in Quebec," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 33(1), pages 1-20, March.
- Pierre-Olivier Pineau, 2008. "Electricity Subsidies in Low-Cost Jurisdictions: The Case of British Columbia," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 34(3), pages 379-394, September.
- Cetin, Tamer & Oguz, Fuat, 2007. "The politics of regulation in the Turkish electricity market," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 1761-1770, March.
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