Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Voting on Abortion in the House of Commons: A Test for Legislator Shirking

Contents:

Author Info

  • Neil Longley
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Using an agency theory approach, this paper examines the tightness of the links in the relationship between Canadian Members of Parliament (MPs) and their respective constituents. The paper focuses on a 1988 parliamentary free vote on the abortion issue. It finds that MP voting on this issue did not appear to be influenced by the preferences of constituents, but was significantly influenced by the personal ideologies of the MPs themselves. Under an agency theory view, these results can be interpreted as evidence of "shirking" behaviour by legislators. Futhermore, to the extent that legislator shirking was found to exist, this shirking was more likely in constituencies where greater constituent-legislator slack was present. Greater constituent-legislator slack lowers the political cost to the legislator of engaging in shirking, since such shirking behaviour is less likely to be punished by constituents.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0317-0861%28199912%2925%3A4%3C503%3AVOAITH%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0
    Download Restriction: only available to JSTOR subscribers

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by University of Toronto Press in its journal Canadian Public Policy.

    Volume (Year): 25 (1999)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 503-521

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:cpp:issued:v:25:y:1999:i:4:p:503-521

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: University of Toronto Press Journals Division 5201 Dufferin Street Toronto, Ontario, Canada M3H 5T8
    Email:
    Web page: http://economics.ca/cpp/

    Order Information:
    Email:
    Web: http://www.utpjournals.com/cpp/

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
    2. John Lott & W. Reed, 1989. "Shirking and sorting in a political market with finite-lived politicians," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 75-96, April.
    3. Longley, Neil, 1998. " Legislative Systems with Absolute Party Discipline: Implications for the Agency Theory Approach to the Constituent-Legislator Link," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 97(1-2), pages 121-40, October.
    4. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    5. Brady, David & Schwartz, Edward P, 1995. " Ideology and Interests in Congressional Voting: The Politics of Abortion in the U.S. Senate," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 84(1-2), pages 25-48, July.
    6. Nelson, Douglas & Silberberg, Eugene, 1987. "Ideology and Legislator Shirking," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(1), pages 15-25, January.
    7. George Stigler, 1972. "Economic competition and political competition," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 91-106, September.
    8. Stephan F. Gohmann & Robert L. Ohsfeldt, 1990. "Predicting State Abortion Legislation From U.S. Senate Votes: The Effects Of Apparent Ideological Shirking," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 9(4), pages 749-762, 06.
    9. Medoff, Marshall H, 1988. "An Economic Analysis of the Demand for Abortions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(2), pages 353-59, April.
    10. Kalt, Joseph P & Zupan, Mark A, 1984. "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 279-300, June.
    11. Poole, Keith T & Romer, Thomas, 1993. " Ideology, "Shirking", and Representation," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 77(1), pages 185-96, September.
    12. Goff, Brian L & Grier, Kevin B, 1993. " On the (Mis)measurement of Legislator Ideology and Shirking," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 76(1-2), pages 5-20, June.
    13. Zupan, Mark A, 1990. " The Last Period Problem in Politics: Do Congressional Representatives Not Subject to a Reelection Constraint Alter Their Voting Behavior?," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 65(2), pages 167-80, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Saam, Nicole J., 2007. "Asymmetry in information versus asymmetry in power: Implicit assumptions of agency theory?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(6), pages 825-840, December.
    2. Eric Crampton, 2002. "Distributive Politics in a Strong Party System: Evidence from Canadian Job Grant Programs," Microeconomics, EconWPA 0211001, EconWPA.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpp:issued:v:25:y:1999:i:4:p:503-521. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Prof. Werner Antweiler).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.