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Legislative Systems with Absolute Party Discipline: Implications for the Agency Theory Approach to the Constituent-Legislator Link

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  • Longley, Neil

Abstract

This paper examines how the presence of absolute party discipline forces one to reexamine some of the issues surrounding the constituent-legislator link. With absolute party discipline, slack at the individual district level is determined by the policy choices of a political party, rather than by the choices of the individual legislator. This party discipline not only has implications for the representational effectiveness of individual legislators but also results in the terms 'slack' and 'shirking' no longer necessarily being synonymous. The empirical work shows that Canadian political parties engaged in wide-scale shirking on the 1988 U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Longley, Neil, 1998. "Legislative Systems with Absolute Party Discipline: Implications for the Agency Theory Approach to the Constituent-Legislator Link," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(1-2), pages 121-140, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:97:y:1998:i:1-2:p:121-40
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Neil Longley, 2003. "Modeling the Legislator as an Agent for the Party: The Effects of Strict Party Discipline on Legislator Voting Behavior," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 21(4), pages 490-499, October.
    2. Per G. Fredriksson & Jim R. Wollscheid, 2014. "Political Institutions, Political Careers and Environmental Policy," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(1), pages 54-73, February.
    3. Brandon Schaufele, 2013. "Dissent in Parliament as Reputation Building," Working Papers 1301E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
    4. Saam, Nicole J., 2007. "Asymmetry in information versus asymmetry in power: Implicit assumptions of agency theory?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 36(6), pages 825-840, December.
    5. Aidt, T. S & Grey, F. & Savu, A., 2019. "The Three Meaningful Votes: Voting on Brexit in the British House of Commons," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1979, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    6. Eric Crampton, 2002. "Distributive Politics in a Strong Party System: Evidence from Canadian Job Grant Programs," Microeconomics 0211001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Neil Longley, 1999. "Voting on Abortion in the House of Commons: A Test for Legislator Shirking," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 25(4), pages 503-521, December.
    8. Toke Aidt & Felix Grey & Alexandru Savu, 2021. "The Meaningful Votes: Voting on Brexit in the British House of Commons," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(3), pages 587-617, March.
    9. Franklin G. Mixon & Rand W. Ressler & M. Troy Gibson, 2003. "Congressional Memberships as Political Advertising: Evidence from the U.S. Senate," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 70(2), pages 414-424, October.

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