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Gouvernement d’entreprise:un modèle de répartition de la valeur créée entre dirigeant et actionnaire

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Author Info

  • Pascal Louvet

    ()
    (Université de Grenoble 2)

  • Ollivier Taramasco

    (Université de Grenoble 2)

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    Abstract

    (VF)L’article présente un modèle décrivant le partage de la valeur créée entre le dirigeant et l’actionnaire. Le modèle montre que le limogeage représente une menace très dissuasive pour le dirigeant qui suffit le plus souvent à réfréner son appétit pour les prélèvements discrétionnaires. Aussi l’actionnaire, grâce à son droit de limogeage, engrange-t-il la plus grande part de la valeur créée.(VA)This article presents a model explaining how created value is distributed among managers and shareholders. Shareholders actually have the right to dismiss the CEO, the impact of which may be described in terms of an option on substitute investments. The risk of dismissal encourages the CEO to refrain from the consumption of perquisites. Consequently, shareholders appropriate the largest proportion of created value.

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    File URL: http://leg2.u-bourgogne.fr/rev/071116.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by revues.org in its journal Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie.

    Volume (Year): 7 (2004)
    Issue (Month): 1 (March)
    Pages: 81-116

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    Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:7:y:2004:i:q1:p:81-116

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    Related research

    Keywords: gouvernance; limogeage; dirigeant; actionnaire; dividende; option réelle; capital humain; création de valeur; governance; dismissal; manager; shareholder; dividend; real option; human capital; creation of value.;

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    References

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    1. Gérard Charreaux, 2002. "Variation sur le thème:"À la recherche de nouvelles fondations pour la finance et la gouvernance d'entreprise"," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 5(3), pages 5-68, September.
    2. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-95, December.
    3. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-29, May.
    4. Baxter, Marianne & Jermann, Urban J, 1997. "The International Diversification Puzzle Is Worse Than You Think," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 170-80, March.
    5. Luigi Zingales, 2000. "In Search of New Foundations," NBER Working Papers 7706, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Williamson, Oliver E, 1988. " Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(3), pages 567-91, July.
    7. Mann, Steven V & Sicherman, Neil W, 1991. "The Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow: Acquisition Activity and Equity Issues," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(2), pages 213-27, April.
    8. Demsetz, Harold, 1983. "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 375-90, June.
    9. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    10. Myers, Stewart C., 1977. "Determinants of corporate borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-175, November.
    11. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-83, June.
    12. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1989. "Management entrenchment : The case of manager-specific investments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 123-139, November.
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