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Gouvernement d’entreprise:un modèle de répartition de la valeur créée entre dirigeant et actionnaire

Author

Listed:
  • Pascal Louvet

    (Université de Grenoble 2)

  • Ollivier Taramasco

    (Université de Grenoble 2)

Abstract

(VF)L’article présente un modèle décrivant le partage de la valeur créée entre le dirigeant et l’actionnaire. Le modèle montre que le limogeage représente une menace très dissuasive pour le dirigeant qui suffit le plus souvent à réfréner son appétit pour les prélèvements discrétionnaires. Aussi l’actionnaire, grâce à son droit de limogeage, engrange-t-il la plus grande part de la valeur créée.(VA)This article presents a model explaining how created value is distributed among managers and shareholders. Shareholders actually have the right to dismiss the CEO, the impact of which may be described in terms of an option on substitute investments. The risk of dismissal encourages the CEO to refrain from the consumption of perquisites. Consequently, shareholders appropriate the largest proportion of created value.

Suggested Citation

  • Pascal Louvet & Ollivier Taramasco, 2004. "Gouvernement d’entreprise:un modèle de répartition de la valeur créée entre dirigeant et actionnaire," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 7(1), pages 81-116, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:7:y:2004:i:q1:p:81-116
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    gouvernance; limogeage; dirigeant; actionnaire; dividende; option réelle; capital humain; création de valeur; governance; dismissal; manager; shareholder; dividend; real option; human capital; creation of value.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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