Michael C. Jensen argues that there are agency costs associated with free cash flow. This study extends that argument and posits that shareholders condition their valuation decisions on firms' reputations regarding free cash flow abuse. The authors test this notion by examining share price responses to equity offers, which generally exacerbate the cash flow problem, for firms differentiated by their recent acquisitive behavior. The results suggest that shareholders react more favorably to equity issue announcements if firms have acquired only assets related to their core business than to other equity issue announcements. Copyright 1991 by University of Chicago Press.
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Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Business.
Volume (Year): 64 (1991) Issue (Month): 2 (April) Pages: 213-27 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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