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Tort Reform Voting in the U.S. Senate

Author

Listed:
  • Peter A. Zaleski

    (Villanova University)

  • Penny Maier Donati

    (Fuji Medical Systems)

Abstract

This article analyzes the determinants of Senate voting on tort reform. The key issue addressed is the effect of party affiliation, experience as an attorney, constituent economic interests, and contributions to Senate candidates from the American Trial Lawyers' Political Action Committee (ATLPAC) on subsequent voting on tort reform legislation in the Senate. The article employs logit regression to model the determinants of voting on tort reform in the Senate. The results suggest that party interests, constituent interests, and self-interest influenced voting on tort reform. Democratic senators and those who are attorneys were less likely to vote in favor of tort reform. Contributions from ATLPAC significantly decreased the likelihood of a senator voting for tort reform. The size of the legal profession within the senator's state and the number of new corporations in the state have a small but significant impact.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter A. Zaleski & Penny Maier Donati, 2000. "Tort Reform Voting in the U.S. Senate," Public Finance Review, , vol. 28(5), pages 415-427, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:28:y:2000:i:5:p:415-427
    DOI: 10.1177/109114210002800502
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    References listed on IDEAS

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