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Timing of Emissions and Effects of Emission Taxes in Durable-Goods Oligopolies

Author

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  • Sagasta Amagoia

    (Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico II, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, University of the Basque Country UPV/EHU, Avda. Lehendakari Agirre, 83, 48015Bilbao, Spain)

  • Usategui José M.

    (Fundamentos del Análisis Económico II, Facultad de Economía y Empresa. University of the Basque Country UPV/EHU, Bilbao, Spain)

Abstract

Given an oligopoly of firms that produce and sell a durable good that causes pollution at production, during use or at disposal, the effects of present and future emission taxes on quantities, emissions, consumer surplus, producer surplus and the sum of consumer and producer surpluses and the revenue from emission taxes for each type of emission are analyzed. Among other results, it is proved that producers may support an increase in the emission tax in the future or in the present, that emissions in the present may be increasing in the emission tax in the future and that the timing of emissions may affect the directions of some effects of a change in an emission tax on welfare variables. The results obtained are based on the interaction between present and future emission taxes, the intertemporal effects of such taxes, imperfect competition, the strategic behavior of each firm in stealing sales from its rivals in the present and in the future, the type of emission and the producers’ commitment problem. The analysis is extended to the cases of monopoly and perfect competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Sagasta Amagoia & Usategui José M., 2018. "Timing of Emissions and Effects of Emission Taxes in Durable-Goods Oligopolies," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 18(4), pages 1-21, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:18:y:2018:i:4:p:21:n:3
    DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2017-0145
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    durable good; emission taxes; environmental damage; imperfect competition; timing of emissions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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