Leasing versus selling and firm efficiency in oligopoly
AbstractWe examine sales and leasing of a durable good in an asymmetric duopoly. We find that inefficient firms tend to lease more. While the low cost firm sells more than the high cost firm, the high cost firm leases more. Further, an increase in unit costs implies a higher ratio of leased units to sales. This pattern is reversed when the unit cost decreases significantly over time.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 66 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Other versions of this item:
- Saggi, Kamal & Vettas, Nikolaos, 1999. "Leasing versus Selling and Firm Efficiency in Oligopoly," Working Papers 99-07, Duke University, Department of Economics.
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bulow, Jeremy, 1986. "An Economic Theory of Planned Obsolescence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(4), pages 729-49, November.
- Bulow, Jeremy I, 1982. "Durable-Goods Monopolists," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(2), pages 314-32, April.
- Dixit, Avinash, 1979.
"The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
140, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Sam Bucovetsky & John Chilton, 1986. "Concurrent Renting and Selling in a Durable-Goods Monopoly under Threat of Entry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 261-275, Summer.
- Poddar, Sougata, 2004. "Strategic choice in durable goods market when firms move simultaneously," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 175-186, June.
- Kim, Jae-Cheol & Kim, Min-Young & Chun, Se-Hak, 2014. "Property tax and its effects on strategic behavior of leasing and selling for a durable-goods monopolist," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 132-144.
- Goering, Gregory E., 2005. "Durable goods monopoly and quality choice," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 59-66, March.
- Xiong, Yu & Yan, Wei & Fernandes, Kiran & Xiong, Zhong-Kai & Guo, Nian, 2012. "“Bricks vs. Clicks”: The impact of manufacturer encroachment with a dealer leasing and selling of durable goods," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 217(1), pages 75-83.
- Sagasta Elorza, Amagoia & Usategui Díaz de Otalora, José María, 2012. "Optimal overall emissions taxation in durable goods oligopoly," DFAEII Working Papers DFAEII;2012-18, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.