Optimal Taxation for Polluting Oligopolists with Endogenous Market Structure
AbstractThis paper examines the optimal output taxes for polluting oligopolists under endogenous market structure, in the presence of external costs that vary exogenously with aggregate output. For general functional forms, we show that (i) the equilibrium number of firms in an industry may differ from the socially optimal number of firms and (ii) the second-best optimal taxes under imperfect competition could be less than, equal to, or greater than marginal external damages depending upon the curvature of market demand. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics.
Volume (Year): 15 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100298
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Espínola-Arredondo, Ana & Muñoz-García, Félix, 2013. "When does environmental regulation facilitate entry-deterring practices," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 133-152.
- Maia David & Alain-Désiré Nimubona & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2007. "Environmental Taxation and the Structure of the Eco-industry," Working Papers 2007/02, INRA, Economie Publique.
- Joanna Poyago-Thotoky, 2003.
"Optimal Environmental Taxation, R&D Subsidization and the Role of Market Conduct,"
Finnish Economic Papers,
Finnish Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 15-26, Spring.
- Joanna Poyago-Theotoky, 2003. "Optimal environmental taxation, R&D subsidization and the role of market conduct," Discussion Paper Series, Department of Economics 200309, Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews.
- Sengupta Aditi, 2010.
"Environmental Regulation and Industry Dynamics,"
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy,
De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-29, June.
- de, Vries Frans & Schoonbeek, Lambert, 2008.
"Environmental Taxes and Industry Monopolization,"
Stirling Economics Discussion Papers
2008-19, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
- Fischer, Carolyn, 2011.
"Market power and output-based refunding of environmental policy revenues,"
Resource and Energy Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 212-230, January.
- Fischer, Carolyn, 2003. "Market Power and Output-Based Refunding of Environmental Policy Revenues," Discussion Papers dp-03-27, Resources For the Future.
- Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2013. "Design standards and technology adoption: Welfare effects of increasing environmental fines when the number of firms is endogenous," DICE Discussion Papers 106, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Fischer, Carolyn, 2003. "Output-Based Allocation of Environmental Policy Revenues and Imperfect Competition," Discussion Papers dp-02-60, Resources For the Future.
- Meredith Fowlie & Mar Reguant & Stephen P. Ryan, 2012. "Market-Based Emissions Regulation and Industry Dynamics," NBER Working Papers 18645, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- David, Maia & Nimubona, Alain-Désiré & Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard, 2011. "Emission taxes and the market for abatement goods and services," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 179-191, January.
- Manel Antelo, 2005. "Double informational asymmetry, signaling, and environmental taxes," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2005/25, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
- Antelo, Manel & Loureiro, Maria L., 2009. "Asymmetric information, signaling and environmental taxes in oligopoly," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(5), pages 1430-1440, March.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.