Tax and Subsidy Combinations for the Control of Car Pollution
AbstractDespite technological advances, an individual car's emissions still cannot be measured reliably enough to impose a Pigovian tax. This paper explores alternative market incentives that could be used instead. We solve for second-best combinations of uniform taxes on gasoline, engine size, and vehicle age. For 1,261 individuals and cars in the 1994 Consumer Expenditure Survey, we record the car's model, year, and number of cylinders. We then seek a corresponding car in data from the California Air Resources Board that shows the car's engine size, fuel efficiency, and emissions per mile. We calculate the welfare improvement from a zero-tax scenario to the ideal Pigovian tax, and we find that 71 percent of that gain can be achieved by the second-best combination of taxes on gas, size, and vintage. A gas tax alone attains 62 percent of that gain. These results are robust to variation in the elasticity of substitution among goods.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Gruyter in its journal The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy.
Volume (Year): 10 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.degruyter.com
Other versions of this item:
- Don Fullerton & Sarah West, 2000. "Tax and Subsidy Combinations for the Control of Car Pollution," NBER Working Papers 7774, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dahl, Carol & Sterner, Thomas, 1991. "Analysing gasoline demand elasticities: a survey," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 203-210, July.
- Fullerton, Don & West, Sarah E., 2002.
"Can Taxes on Cars and on Gasoline Mimic an Unavailable Tax on Emissions?,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 135-157, January.
- Don Fullerton & Sarah West, 1999. "Can Taxes on Cars and on Gasoline Mimic an Unavailable Tax on Emissions?," NBER Working Papers 7059, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Molly Espey, 1996. "Explaining the Variation in Elasticity Estimates of Gasoline Demand in the United States: A Meta-Analysis," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 49-60.
- Robert Kohn, 1996. "An additive tax and subsidy for controlling automobile pollution," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(7), pages 459-462.
- Hulten, Charles R & Wykoff, Frank C, 1996. "Issues in the Measurement of Economic Depreciation: Introductory Remarks," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(1), pages 10-23, January.
- Small, K.A. & Kazimi, C., 1994.
"On the Costs of Air Pollution from Motor Vehicules,"
94-95-3, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
- Small, Kenneth A. & Kazimi, Camilla, 1995. "On the Costs of Air Pollution from Motor Vehicles," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt0sx81025, University of California Transportation Center.
- Jorgenson, Dale W, 1996.
"Empirical Studies of Depreciation,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(1), pages 24-42, January.
- Jorgenson, D.W., 1994. "Empirical Studies of Depriciation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1704, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Eskeland, Gunnar S, 1994. "A Presumptive Pigovian Tax: Complementing Regulation to Mimic an Emissions Fee," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 8(3), pages 373-94, September.
- Innes, Robert, 1996. "Regulating Automobile Pollution under Certainty, Competition, and Imperfect Information," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 219-239, September.
- Mayeres, Inge & Proost, Stef, 1997. " Optimal Tax and Public Investment Rules for Congestion Type of Externalities," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 99(2), pages 261-79, June.
- Anna Alberini & Winston Harrington & Virginia McConnell, 1995. "Determinants of Participation in Accelerated Vehicle-Retirement Programs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(1), pages 93-112, Spring.
- Hoel, Michael, 1998. " Emission Taxes versus Other Environmental Policies," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 100(1), pages 79-104, March.
- Ohta, Makoto & Griliches, Zvi, 1986. "Automobile Prices and Quality: Did the Gasoline Price Increases Change Consumer Tastes in the U.S.?," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 4(2), pages 187-98, April.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.