In the environmental policy of most countries, various forms of quotas and direct regulation are more important than environmental taxes. This paper addresses four arguments which are often given against the use of emission taxes. The three arguments related to information asymmetries and nonconvexities are valid in the sense that they point to complications in the use of environmental taxes. The fourth argument is related to the employment effects of different types of environmental policies in economies with unemployment. Although this argument is frequently used by politicians, the analysis provides no justification for it. On the contrary: in the model used, employment is higher with environmental taxes than with nonrevenue-raising environmental policies. Copyright 1998 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
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Volume (Year): 100 (1998) Issue (Month): 1 (March) Pages: 79-104 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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