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Abstract

Social sanctions may be a strong deterrent of crime. This paper presents a formal model that relates crime and social sanction to social interaction density. We empirically test the theoretical predictions using a provincial level panel dataset on dierent crimes in Italy between 1996 and 2003. We exploit detailed demographic and geo-morphological information to develop exogenous measures of social interaction density. We estimate a spatial panel model by means of a GMM procedure and we nd that provinces with denser social interactions display significantly and substantially lower rates of property crime, but not of violent crime.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1435-5957.2010.00349.x
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Papers in Regional Science.

Volume (Year): 91 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
Pages: 193-218

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Handle: RePEc:bla:presci:v:91:y:2012:i:1:p:193-218

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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1056-8190

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Find related papers by JEL classification:

• A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
• K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
• Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification

References

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Cited by:

1. Buonanno, Paolo & Durante, Ruben & Prarolo, Giovanni & Vanin, Paolo, 2011. "On the historical and geographic origins of the Sicilian mafia," MPRA Paper 37009, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Feb 2012.
2. P. Buonanno & R. Durante & G. Prarolo & P. Vanin, 2012. "Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse and the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia," Working Papers wp844, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
   
   • Paolo Buonanno & Ruben Durante & Giovanni Prarolo & Paolo Vanin, 2012. "Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse and the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 261, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
   • Paolo Buonanno & Ruben Durante & Giovanni Prarolo & Paolo Vanin, 2012. "Poor institutions, rich mines: resource curse and the origins of the Sicilian mafia," Working Papers 2012/29, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
3. Stuart McIntyre & Donald Lacombe, 2012. "Personal Indebtedness, Spatial Effects and Crime," Working Papers 1209, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.
4. Kyriakos C. Neanidis & Vea Papadopoulou, 2012. "Crime, Fertility, and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 163, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester.

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