Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse and the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia
AbstractThis study explains the emergence of the Sicilian mafia in the XIX century as the product of the interaction between natural resource abundance and weak institutions. We advance the hypothesis that the mafia emerged after the collapse of the Bourbon Kingdom in a context characterized by a severe lack of state property-right enforcement in response to the rising demand for the protection of sulfur - Sicily's most valuable export commodity - whose demand in the international markets was soaring at the time. We test this hypothesis combining data on the early presence of the mafia and on the distribution of sulfur reserves across Sicilian municipalities and find evidence of a positive and significant effect of sulphur availability on mafia's diffusion. These results remain unchanged when including department fixed-effects and various geographical and historical controls, when controlling for spatial correlation, and when comparing pairs of neighboring municipalities with and without sulfur.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna in its series Working Papers with number wp844.
Date of creation: Sep 2012
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Piazza Scaravilli, 2, and Strada Maggiore, 45, 40125 Bologna
Phone: +39 051 209 8019 and 2600
Fax: +39 051 209 8040 and 2664
Web page: http://www.dse.unibo.it
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Paolo Buonanno & Ruben Durante & Giovanni Prarolo & Paolo Vanin, 2012. "Poor institutions, rich mines: resource curse and the origins of the Sicilian mafia," Working Papers 2012/29, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- Paolo Buonanno & Ruben Durante & Giovanni Prarolo & Paolo Vanin, 2012. "Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse and the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 261, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- N33 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - - - Europe: Pre-1913
- N54 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Europe: 1913-
- O13 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
- O43 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-EUR-2012-09-16 (Microeconomic European Issues)
- NEP-HIS-2012-09-16 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-IUE-2012-09-16 (Informal & Underground Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2012-09-16 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Arcangelo Dimico & Alessia Isopi & Ola Olsson, .
"Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: The Market for Lemons,"
12/01, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
- Dimico, Arcangelo & Isopi, Alessia & Olsson, Ola, 2012. "Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: The Market for Lemons," Working Papers in Economics 532, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
- Paolo Buonanno & Giacomo Pasini & Paolo Vanin, 2008.
"Crime and Social Sanction,"
"Marco Fanno" Working Papers
0071, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
- Oriana Bandiera, 2003. "Land Reform, the Market for Protection, and the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 218-244, April.
- Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2000.
"The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,"
NBER Working Papers
7771, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December.
- Stelios Michalopoulos, 2011.
"The Origins of Technolinguistic Diversity,"
Economics Working Papers
0095, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Michalopoulos, Stelios & Naghavi, Alireza & Prarolo, Giovanni, 2010.
"Trade and Geography in the Economic Origins of Islam: Theory and Evidence,"
23136, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Stelios Michalopoulos & Alireza Naghavi & Giovanni Prarolo, . "Trade and Geography in the Economic Origins of Islam: Theory and Evidence," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0750, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
- Stelios Michalopoulos & Alireza Naghavi & Giovanni Prarolo, 2010. "Trade and geography in the economic origins of Islam: theory and evidence," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 046, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics.
- S. Michalopoulos & A. Naghavi & G. Prarolo, 2010. "Trade and Geography in the Economic Origins of Islam: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 700, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Stelios Michalopoulos & Alireza Naghavi & Giovanni Prarolo, 2010. "Trade and Geography in the Economic Origins of Islam: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 2010.75, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Stelios Michalopoulos & Alireza Naghavi & Giovanni Prarolo, 2010. "Trade and Geography in the Economic Origins of Islam: Theory and Evidence," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 145, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote, 1996.
"Why is There More Crime in Cities?,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1746, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Ruben Durante, 2010.
"Risk, Cooperation and the Economic origins of social Trust: an empirical Investigation,"
Sciences Po publications
info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompq, Sciences Po.
- Durante, Ruben, 2009. "Risk, Cooperation and the Economic Origins of Social Trust: an Empirical Investigation," MPRA Paper 25887, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Halvor Mehlum & Karl Ove Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2005.
"Cursed by resources or institutions?,"
Working Paper Series
5705, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
- Anderson, James E. & Bandiera, Oriana, 2005. "Private enforcement and social efficiency," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 341-366, August.
- Konrad, Kai A & Skaperdas, Stergios, 1999.
"The Market for Protection and the Origin of the State,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2173, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kai Konrad & Stergios Skaperdas, 2012. "The market for protection and the origin of the state," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 417-443, June.
- Kai A. Konrad & Stergios Skaperdas, 2005. "The Market for Protection and the Origin of the State," CESifo Working Paper Series 1578, CESifo Group Munich.
- Konrad, Kai A. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2012. "The market for protection and the origin of the state," Munich Reprints in Economics 13961, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- David N. Weil & Oded Galor, 2000. "Population, Technology, and Growth: From Malthusian Stagnation to the Demographic Transition and Beyond," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 806-828, September.
- Mastrobuoni Giovanni & Patacchini Eleonora, 2012. "Organized Crime Networks: an Application of Network Analysis Techniques to the American Mafia," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 1-43, September.
- G�ran Therborn & K.C. Ho, 2009. "Introduction," City, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(1), pages 53-62, March.
- Varese, Federico, 2005. "The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199279494.
- Giuseppe De Feo & Giacomo De Luca, 2013.
"Mafia in the ballot box,"
DEM Working Papers Series
057, University of Pavia, Department of Economics and Management.
- Giuseppe De Feo & Giacomo De Luca, 2013. "Mafia in the ballot box," Working Papers 1325, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.
- De Feo, Giuseppe & De Luca, Giacomo, 2013. "Mafia in the ballot box," SIRE Discussion Papers 2013-104, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- Guglielmo Barone & Gaia Narciso, 2012.
"The Effect Of Mafia On Public Transfers,"
The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series
- Guglielmo Barone & Gaia Narciso, 2013. "The Effect of Mafia on Public Transfers," Working Paper Series 34_13, The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
- Guglielmo Barone & Gaia Narciso, 2011. "The effect of mafia on public transfers," Trinity Economics Papers tep2111, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
- Guglielmo Barone & Gaia Narciso, 2013. "The effect of organized crime on public funds," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 916, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Kyriakos C. Neanidis & Maria Paola Rana, 2014. "Entrepreneurs, Risk Aversion and Dynamic Firms," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 190, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester.
- Meier, Stephan & Pierce, Lamar & Vaccaro, Antonino, 2014. "Trust and In-Group Favoritism in a Culture of Crime," IZA Discussion Papers 8169, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Mathieu Couttenier & Pauline Grosjean & Marc Sangnier, 2014. "The Wild West is Wild: The Homicide Resource Curse," Discussion Papers 2014-12, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Luca Miselli).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.