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Federalism And The Balance Of Power: China'S Han And Tang Dynasties And The Roman Empire

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  • Ronald A Edwards

Abstract

. This paper compares the institutional history of the Han Dynasty (206 BC–AD 220), Tang Dynasty (AD 618–AD 906) and the Roman Empire (27 BC–AD 476). I document a common institutional reform in all three cases: the central government assumed power to appoint key regional officials and diffused authority across a greater number of regional officials. I argue that this served to increase coordination costs among key regional officials, making rebellion and resistance to central directives more costly. As a result, this institutional reform shifted the balance of power toward the central government, giving it more control.

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  • Ronald A Edwards, 2009. "Federalism And The Balance Of Power: China'S Han And Tang Dynasties And The Roman Empire," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(1), pages 1-21, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:pacecr:v:14:y:2009:i:1:p:1-21
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0106.2009.00430.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Haiwen Zhou, 2021. "Culture, institutions, and long‐run performance," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(3), pages 372-391, August.
    2. Haiwen Zhou, 2018. "A Model of Institutional Complementarities in Ancient China," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 286-304, April.

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