He Who Counts Elects: Determinants of Fraud in the 1922 Colombian Presidential Election
AbstractThis paper constructs measures of the extent of ballot stuffing (fraudulent votes) and electoral coercion at the municipal level using data from Colombia's 1922 Presidential elections. Our main findings are that the presence of the state reduced the extent of ballot stuffing, but that of the clergy, which was closely imbricated in partisan politics, increased coercion. We also show that landed elites to some extent substituted for the absence of the state and managed to reduce the extent of fraud where they were strong. At the same time, in places which were completely out of the sphere of the state, and thus partisan politics, both ballot stuffing and coercion were relatively low. Thus the relationship between state presence and fraud is not monotonic.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 15127.
Date of creation: Jul 2009
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- H0 - Public Economics - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-07-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-07-11 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-HIS-2009-07-11 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
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RePEc Biblio mentionsAs found on the RePEc Biblio, the curated bibliography for Economics:
- > Economic History > Regional Economic History > Latin American Economic History > Economic History of Colombia
- Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Rafael Santos, 2009.
"The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence from Colombia,"
NBER Working Papers
15578, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Rafael J. Santos, 2013. "The Monopoly Of Violence: Evidence From Colombia," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11, pages 5-44, 01.
- Diego Jara & Felipe Parra & Alvaro Riascos & Mauricio Romero, 2011. "AnÃ¡lisis digital y detecciÃ³n de elecciones atÃpicas," DOCUMENTOS CEDE, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE 009064, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
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