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He Who Counts Elects: Determinants of Fraud in the 1922 Colombian Presidential Election

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  • Isaías N. Chaves
  • Leopoldo Fergusson
  • James A. Robinson

Abstract

This paper constructs measures of the extent of ballot stuffing (fraudulent votes) and electoral coercion at the municipal level using data from Colombia's 1922 Presidential elections. Our main findings are that the presence of the state reduced the extent of ballot stuffing, but that of the clergy, which was closely imbricated in partisan politics, increased coercion. We also show that landed elites to some extent substituted for the absence of the state and managed to reduce the extent of fraud where they were strong. At the same time, in places which were completely out of the sphere of the state, and thus partisan politics, both ballot stuffing and coercion were relatively low. Thus the relationship between state presence and fraud is not monotonic.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 15127.

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Date of creation: Jul 2009
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15127

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  1. > Economic History > Regional Economic History > Latin American Economic History > Economic History of Colombia
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Cited by:
  1. Diego Jara & Felipe Parra & Alvaro Riascos & Mauricio Romero, 2011. "Análisis digital y detección de elecciones atípicas," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 009064, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
  2. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Rafael J. Santos, 2013. "The Monopoly Of Violence: Evidence From Colombia," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11, pages 5-44, 01.

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