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Abstract

Many employment relationships concede rents to workers. Depending on the political institutions, the presence of such rents allows employers to use the threat of withdrawing them to control their workers' political behavior, such as their votes in the absence of secret ballot. We examine the effects of the introduction of the secret ballot in Chile in 1958 on voting behavior. Before the reforms, localities with more pervasive patron-client relationships tended to exhibit a much stronger support for the right-wing parties, traditionally associated with the landed oligarchy. After the reform, however, this difference across localities completely disappeared. (JEL D72, N46, O13, O15, O17)

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File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.98.5.1737
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 98 (2008)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
Pages: 1737-65

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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:5:p:1737-65

Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.5.1737
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Find related papers by JEL classification:

• D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• N46 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Latin America; Caribbean
• O13 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
• O15 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
• O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

References

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1. Sadoulet, Elisabeth, 1992. "Labor-Service Tenancy Contracts in a Latin American Context," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 1031-42, September.
2. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini , Guido, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," Seminar Papers 630, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
   
   • Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political economics and macroeconomic policy," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1397-1482 Elsevier.
   • Persson, T. & Tabellini, G., 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," Papers 630, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
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   • Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 1759, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
3. Piketty, Thomas, 1999. "The information-aggregation approach to political institutions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 791-800, April.
4. Piketty, Thomas, 2000. "Voting as Communicating," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(1), pages 169-91, January.
5. Jackson, Matthew O. & Dekel, Eddie & Wolinsky, Asher, 2005. "Vote buying," Working Papers 1215, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
   
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   • Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 2004. "Vote Buying," Discussion Papers 1386, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
6. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "The Economic Effects of Constitutions," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661926.
7. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Andrew F. Newman, 1990. "Occupational Choice and the Process of Development," Discussion Papers 911, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
   
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8. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2006. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521855266.
   
   • Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422.
9. Legros, Patrick & Newman, Andrew F., 1996. "Wealth Effects, Distribution, and the Theory of Organization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 312-341, August.
   
   • Patrick Legros & Andrew Newman, 1996. "Wealth effects, distribution, and the theory of organization," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7036, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
10. Dilip Mookherjee, 1995. "Informational Rents and Property Rights in Land," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 55, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
11. Gene Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1994. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," NBER Working Papers 4877, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    
    • Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(2), pages 265-86, April.
12. James M. Snyder, 1991. "On Buying Legislatures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(2), pages 93-109, 07.
13. David P. Baron & Daniel Diermeier, 2001. "Elections, Governments, And Parliaments In Proportional Representation Systems," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(3), pages 933-967, August.

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Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:

1. Land and Politics
   by Marc F. Bellemare in Marc F. Bellemare on 2012-04-18 09:00:22

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

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Cited by:

1. Bertocchi, Graziella & Dimico, Arcangelo, 2011. "Race v. Suffrage: The Determinants of Development in Mississippi," IZA Discussion Papers 6017, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
   
   • Bertocchi, Graziella & Dimico, Arcangelo, 2011. "Race v. Suffrage: The Determinants of Development in Mississippi," CEPR Discussion Papers 8589, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Graziella Bertocchi & Arcangelo Dimico, 2011. "Race v. Suffrage The Determinants of Development in Mississippi," Department of Economics 0665, University of Modena and Reggio E., Faculty of Economics "Marco Biagi".
   • Graziella Bertocchi & Arcangelo Dimico, 2011. "Race v. Suffrage. The Determinants of Development in Mississippi," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 071, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics.
2. Bertocchi, Graziella & Dimico, Arcangelo, 2012. "De Jure and de Facto Determinants of Power: Evidence from Mississippi," CEPR Discussion Papers 9064, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   
   • Graziella Bertocchi & Arcangelo Dimico, 2012. "De Jure and de Facto Determinants of Power:Evidence from Mississippi," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 084, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics.
   • Bertocchi, Graziella & Dimico, Arcangelo, 2012. "De Jure and De Facto Determinants of Power: Evidence from Mississippi," IZA Discussion Papers 6741, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
3. Stefan Dercon & Bet Caeyers, 2008. "Political Connections and Social Networks in Targeted Transfer Programmes: Evidence from Rural Ethiopia," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2008-33, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
4. Baland, Jean-Marie & Robinson, James A, 2011. "The Political Value of Land: Democratization and Land Prices in Chile," CEPR Discussion Papers 8296, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
5. Deininger, Klaus & Jin, Songqing & Yadav, Vandana, 2012. "Does sharecropping affect productivity and long-term investment ? evidence from West Bengal's tenancy reforms," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6293, The World Bank.
6. Denis COGNEAU, 2012. "The Political Dimension Of Inequality During Economic Development," Region et Developpement, Region et Developpement, LEAD, Universite du Sud - Toulon Var, vol. 35, pages 11-36.
   
   • Denis Cogneau, 2009. "The political dimension of inequality during economic development," Working Papers DT/2009/10, DIAL (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation).
   • Cogneau, Denis, 2010. "The political dimension of inequality during economic development," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) 1013, CEPREMAP.
   • Cogneau, Denis, . "The Political Dimension of Inequality During Economic Development," Open Access publications from Université Paris-Dauphine urn:hdl:123456789/4302, Université Paris-Dauphine.
7. Aidt, T.S. & Jensen, P.S., 2012. "From Open to Secret Ballot: Vote Buying and Modernization," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1221, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
8. Suresh Naidu, 2012. "Suffrage, Schooling, and Sorting in the Post-Bellum U.S. South," NBER Working Papers 18129, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
9. Monica Martinez-Bravo, 2013. "The Role Of Local Officials In New Democracies: Evidence From Indonesia," Working Papers wp2013_1302, CEMFI.
10. repec:mod:depeco:0001 is not listed on IDEAS
11. Giacomo De Luca, 2008. "Strategic Registration of Voters: The Chilean Case," CEDI Discussion Paper Series 08-17, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University.

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