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Land and Power

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Author Info
Baland, Jean-Marie
Robinson, James A

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Abstract

We study the implications of electoral corruption for resource allocation, factor market equilibrium and inequality. We focus on the control of the voting of agricultural workers by landlords and show that if the employment relationship is subject to moral hazard then the resulting rents conceded by employers give them a comparative advantage in controlling the political activities of their workers. This generates an added incentive to own land and leads to inefficiently high land concentration. We test the predictions of the model by examining in detail the effects of the introduction of the secret ballot in Chile in 1958.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 3800.

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Date of creation: Feb 2003
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3800

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Related research
Keywords: employment; inequality; land; productivity;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Sadoulet, Elisabeth, 1992. "Labor-Service Tenancy Contracts in a Latin American Context," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 1031-42, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 1759, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Legros, Patrick & Newman, Andrew F., 1996. "Wealth Effects, Distribution, and the Theory of Organization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 312-341, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2001. "A Theory of Political Transitions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 938-963, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Pranab Bardhan, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis., 1998. "Wealth Inequality, Wealth Constraints and Economic Performance," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C98-097, University of California at Berkeley.
    Other versions:
  6. Dilip Mookherjee, 1995. "Informational Rents and Property Rights in Land," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 55, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
  7. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(2), pages 265-86, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Banerjee, Abhijit V & Newman, Andrew F, 1993. "Occupational Choice and the Process of Development," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(2), pages 274-98, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Binswanger, Hans P. & Deininger, Klaus & Feder, Gershon, 1993. "Power, distortions, revolt, and reform in agricultural land relations," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1164, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "The Economic Effects of Constitutions," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661926, April.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Conning, Jonathan H & Robinson, James A, 2002. "Land Reform and the Political Organization of Agriculture," CEPR Discussion Papers 3204, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Evans, Peter, 2006. "Extending the 'Institutional' Turn: Property, Politics and Development Trajectories," Working Papers RP2006/113, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER). [Downloadable!]
  3. Jonathan Conning, 2002. "Latifundia Economics," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 02/1, Hunter College: Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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