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Organized crime and electoral outcomes. Evidence from Sicily at the turn of the XXI century

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  • Buonanno, Paolo
  • Prarolo, Giovanni
  • Vanin, Paolo

Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between Sicilian mafia and politics by focusing on municipality-level results of national political elections. It exploits the fact that in the early 1990s the Italian party system collapsed, new parties emerged and mafia families had to look for new political allies. It presents evidence, based on disaggregated data from the Italian region of Sicily, that between 1994 and 2013 Silvio Berlusconi's party, Forza Italia, obtained higher vote shares at national elections in municipalities plagued by mafia. The result is robust to the use of different measures of mafia presence, both contemporary and historical, to the inclusion of different sets of controls and to spatial analysis. Instrumenting mafia presence by determinants of its early diffusion in the late XIX century suggests that the correlation reflects a causal link.

Suggested Citation

  • Buonanno, Paolo & Prarolo, Giovanni & Vanin, Paolo, 2016. "Organized crime and electoral outcomes. Evidence from Sicily at the turn of the XXI century," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 61-74.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:41:y:2016:i:c:p:61-74
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.11.002
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    Cited by:

    1. Boeri, Filippo & Di Cataldo, Marco & Pietrostefani, Elisabetta, 2022. "Localised effects of re-allocated real estate mafia assets," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 116682, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Scognamiglio, Annalisa, 2018. "When the mafia comes to town," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 573-590.
    3. Baraldi, Anna Laura & Immordino, Giovanni & Stimolo, Marco, 2022. "Mafia wears out women in power: Evidence from italian municipalities," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 193(C), pages 213-236.
    4. Pierfrancesco Rolla & Patricia Justino, 2022. "The social consequences of organized crime in Italy," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2022-106, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    5. Marina Cavalieri & Massimo Finocchiaro Castro & Calogero Guccio, 2020. "Does the Fish Rot from the Head? Organised Crime and Educational Outcomes in Southern Italy," Working papers 97, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
    6. Anna Laura Baraldi & Erasmo Pagani & Marco Stimolo, 2023. "Neutralizing the Tentacles of Organized Crime. Assessment of the Impact of an Anti-Crime Measure on Mafia Violence in Italy," Working Papers 2023.10, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    7. Daron Acemoglu & Giuseppe De Feo & Giacomo Davide De Luca, 2020. "Weak States: Causes and Consequences of the Sicilian Mafia," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 87(2), pages 537-581.
    8. Anna Laura Baraldi & Erasmo Pagani & Marco Stimolo, 2022. "Neutralizing the Tentacles of Organized Crime. Assessment of an Anti-Crime Measure in Fighting Mafia Violence," Working Papers 2022.18, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    9. Baraldi, Anna Laura & Papagni, Erasmo & Stimolo, Marco, 2023. "Neutralizing the Tentacles of Organized Crime. Assessment of the Impact of an Anti-Crime Measure on Mafia Violence in Italy," FEEM Working Papers 335068, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    10. Paolo Buonanno & Irene Ferrari & Alessandro Saia, 2023. "ALL IS NOT LOST: Organized Crime and Social Capital Formation," Working Papers 2023: 16, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", revised 2024.
    11. Ravenda, Diego & Giuranno, Michele G. & Valencia-Silva, Maika M. & Argiles-Bosch, Josep M. & García-Blandón, Josep, 2020. "The effects of mafia infiltration on public procurement performance," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    12. Marco Di Cataldo & Nicola Mastrorocco, 2022. "Organized Crime, Captured Politicians, and the Allocation of Public Resources [“Mafiaand Public Spending: Evidence on the Fiscal Multiplier from a Quasi-Experiment]," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(3), pages 774-839.
    13. Francesca M. Calamunci & Livio Ferrante & Rossana Scebba, 2022. "Closed for mafia: Evidence from the removal of mafia firms on commercial property values," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(5), pages 1487-1511, November.
    14. Baraldi, Anna Laura & Immordino, Giovanni & Stimolo, Marco, 2022. "Self-selecting candidates or compelling voters: How organized crime affects political selection," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    15. Ken Yahagi, 2018. "Welfare effects of forming a criminal organization," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 359-375, December.
    16. Mauro Caselli & Andrea Fracasso & Silvio Traverso, 2021. "Globalization, robotization, and electoral outcomes: Evidence from spatial regressions for Italy," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(1), pages 86-111, January.
    17. Nicola Mastrorocco, 2018. "Organised Crime, Captured Politicians and the Allocation of Public Resources," Trinity Economics Papers tep1018, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
    18. Daniele, Gianmarco & Dipoppa, Gemma, 2017. "Mafia, elections and violence against politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 10-33.
    19. Ferrante, Livio & Reito, Francesco & Spagano, Salvatore & Torrisi, Gianpiero, 2021. "Shall we follow the money? Anti-mafia policies and electoral competition," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 43(5), pages 1110-1130.
    20. Gourley, Patrick & Khamis, Melanie, 2023. "It is not easy being a Green party: Green politics as a normal good," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    21. Baraldi, Anna Laura & Papagni, Erasmo & Stimolo, Marco, 2022. "Neutralizing the Tentacles of Organized Crime. Assessment of an Anti-Crime Measure in Fighting Mafia Violence," FEEM Working Papers 322775, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    22. Anna Laura Baraldi & Giovanni Immordino & Erasmo Papagni & Marco Stimolo, 2023. "An Unintended Consequence of Gender Balance Laws: Mafia Fuels Political Violence," CSEF Working Papers 693, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    23. Luigi Balletta & Andrea Mario Lavezzi, 2019. "The Economics of Extortion: Theory and Evidence on the Sicilian Mafia," Discussion Papers 2019/242, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Elections; Mafia-type organizations;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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