Economic and Political Inequality: The Role of Political Mobilization

This paper analyzes the relationship between economic and political inequality. Beyond the view that inequality reduces turnout we document a non-linear relationship between them. To explain these patterns we argue that parties' strategies to target and mobilize low income voters re ect the level of economic inequality and development. Under high inequality and low development, clientelism becomes the dominant form of political competition and turnout in- equality declines. As societies grow and inequality recedes, clientelism becomes suboptimal and parties turn to mobilize voters around programmatic o erings. As a result, turnout inequality increases. Empirically, we produce two analyses. First, we identify the relationship between political mobilization strategies, inequality and turnout by exploiting the randomized allocation of anti-fraud measures across Brazilian municipalities in the early 2000s. Second, we address the generalizability of our ndings by carrying out a cross-national multilevel analysis of the relationship between inequality, strategies for political mobilization, and turnout inequality.