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Analysis of Merger Control in a Network Products Market

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  • Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu

Abstract

Using a horizontally differentiated three‐firm model, we consider horizontal mergers and antitrust policy in a network products market, where network externalities and compatibilities between products and services are observed. In particular, we focus on the role of merger‐related network compatibility. That is, if the degree of the net degree of merger‐related network compatibility is larger than the degree of product substitutability, consumer surplus is higher than in the premerger case. In this case, the proposed merger is allowed by antitrust authorities based on a consumer welfare standard. Furthermore, relating to a merger externality on an outsider, we examine the American Online and Time Warner case.

Suggested Citation

  • Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu, 2019. "Analysis of Merger Control in a Network Products Market," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 87(5), pages 678-693, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:manchs:v:87:y:2019:i:5:p:678-693
    DOI: 10.1111/manc.12277
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    Cited by:

    1. DongJoon Lee & Kangsik Choi & Tatsuhiko Nariu, 2020. "Endogenous vertical structure with network externalities," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 88(6), pages 827-846, December.
    2. Andreea Cosnita‐Langlais & Alexander Rasch, 2023. "Horizontal mergers, cost savings, and network effects," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(1), pages 65-82, January.
    3. Lei Bao & Wenshi Yu, 2022. "Efficiency-Enhancing Horizontal Mergers in Spatial Competition with Network Externalities," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(18), pages 1-13, September.
    4. Yi-Shan Lu & Chien-Shu Tsai & Jen-Yao Lee & Chung-Yang Lee, 2024. "Collusive Stability with Relative Performance and Network Externalities," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(3), pages 1-7, June.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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