To prevent possible abuse of market power, an antitrust agency can force merging firms to divest some of their assets. The divested assets can be sold via auction either to existing competitors or to a new entrant. Divestiture of assets extends the range of parameters when a merger satisfies a consumer surplus standard and should be approved. If the agency takes a more active stance toward the selection of a purchaser of the assets (e.g. to exclude an incumbent from the auction), then it could lead to a favourable outcome for consumers and merging firms.
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Paper provided by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia in its series Working Papers with number
07-16.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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