Corporate Governance Reforms And Executive Compensation Determination: Evidence From The Uk
AbstractThis paper examines the effect that the 'Cadbury reforms' have had on the pay determination process of executives in the UK. Our results suggest that, on average, the impact has been disappointing. The relationship between pay and performance remains weak and the link to firm size has, if anything, been strengthened. However, our results suggest considerable heterogeneity in the impact of the reforms, and for those firms above median employment the link between pay and profits appears to have been reinforced. Copyright � 2007 The Authors; Journal compilation � 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The University of Manchester.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Manchester in its journal Manchester School.
Volume (Year): 75 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (01)
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Other versions of this item:
- Thompson, Steve & Sourafel Girma & Peter W Wright, 2003. "Corporate Governance Reforms and Executive Compensation Determination: Evidence from the UK," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 202, Royal Economic Society.
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- Janto Haman & Hristos Doucouliagos & Michael Graham, 2012. "Agency Problem II and Convergence in CEO Pay," Economics Series 2012_5, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
- Paul Gregg & Sarah Jewell & Ian Tonks, 2005. "Executive Pay and Performance in the UK 1994-2002," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 05/122, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- Bayer, Christian & Burhop, Carsten, 2009.
"Corporate governance and incentive contracts: Historical evidence from a legal reform,"
Explorations in Economic History,
Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 464-481, October.
- Christian Bayer & Carsten Burhop, 2008. "Corporate Governance and Incentive Contracts: Historical Evidence from a Legal Reform," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_11, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Paul Gregg & Sarah Jewell & Ian Tonks, 2010. "Executive Pay and Performance in the UK," FMG Discussion Papers dp657, Financial Markets Group.
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