Incentives to Corporate Governance Activism

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Incentives to Corporate Governance Activism

Author Info

Leech, Dennis (University of Warwick)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Dennis Leech

Abstract

This paper considers incentives faced by investors (financial institutions) to become actively involved in the governance of under-performing companies in their portfolio as recently proposed. By considering the private benefits and the costs of investor activism separately, it questions the conventional wisdom -based on simplistic agency theory - that share ownership is so widely held in the UK that such incentives are too weak for shareholder activism to be a rational basis of a system of corporate governance. It finds that in many cases, by contrast, these incentives would be very strong indeed if conflicts of interest could be avoided.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Royal Economic Society in its series Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 with number 133.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 04 Jun 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecj:ac2003:133

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.res.org.uk/society/annualconf.asp
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Other versions of this item:

Paper
- Leech, Dennis, 2002. "Incentives To Corporate Governance Activism," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 632, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2003-06-16 (All new papers)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Leech, Dennis, 1987. "Ownership Concentration and the Theory of the Firm: A Simple-Game-Theoretic Approach," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(3), pages 225-40, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Tirole, Jean, 2001. "Corporate Governance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 1-35, January.
Other versions:
- Tiroley, Jean, 2000. "Corporate Governance," CEI Working Paper Series 2000-1, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
- Tirole, Jean, 1999. "Corporate Governance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2086, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-83, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1995. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1741, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 5554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Leech, Dennis & Leahy, John, 1991. "Ownership Structure, Control Type Classifications and the Performance of Large British Companies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(409), pages 1418-37, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Leech, D. & Leahy, J., 1989. "Ownership Structure, Control Type Classifications And The Performance Of Large British Companies," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 345, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.

Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Over 80% of the top 1000 economists are registered on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.