The pattern of ownership and control of British industry is unusual compared with most other countries in that ownership is relatively dispersed. Majority ownership by a single shareholder is unusual. It is not uncommon for the largest shareholding to be under 20 percent and in many cases much less than that. A similar pattern occurs in the USA. The question of voting power is the focus of this paper. Conventional analyses of control through voting use a 20% rule to identify a controlling bloc, either a single individual or institutional shareholder or a group voting together. Theoretical voting power of minority shareholding blocs is studied using a voting power index. This is applied to a model of ownership control described in Leech (1987) based on the definition of control used by Berle and Means (1932). The results give support for use of a 20 percent rule in many cases but not all. Also they support the idea that many companies are potentially controlled by a bloc of a few large shareholders working in concert, in almost all cases a voting bloc of the top six shareholdings combined could have working control whether or not it commanded a majority of the shares.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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