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Political Support for Tax Decentralization

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  • SUSANA PERALTA

Abstract

We present a spatial model of a city with two unequally productive jurisdictions. City residents bear a commuting cost to work in either of the two jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction must finance a public budget with a wage and a head tax. We compare the first best optimum to tax decentralization. From the total welfare viewpoint, tax competition is always inefficient. However, majoritarian local governments may prefer the inefficient tax decentralization to the first best. Copyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing, Inc..

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 9 (2007)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
Pages: 1013-1030

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:9:y:2007:i:6:p:1013-1030

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Cited by:
  1. Braid, Ralph M., 2010. "Provision of a pure local public good in a spatial model with many jurisdictions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(11-12), pages 890-897, December.

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