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International Cross-Listing, Firm Performance, and Top Management Turnover: A Test of the Bonding Hypothesis

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Author Info
UGUR LEL
DARIUS P. MILLER

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Abstract

We examine a primary outcome of corporate governance, namely, the ability to identify and terminate poorly performing CEOs, to test the effectiveness of U.S. investor protections in improving the corporate governance of cross-listed firms. We find that firms from weak investor protection regimes that are cross-listed on a major U.S. Exchange are more likely to terminate poorly performing CEOs than non-cross-listed firms. Cross-listings on exchanges that do not require the adoption of stringent investor protections (OTC, private placements, and London listings) are not associated with a higher propensity to remove poorly performing CEOs. Copyright (c) 2008 The American Finance Association.

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File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01377.x
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Article provided by American Finance Association in its journal The Journal of Finance.

Volume (Year): 63 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (08)
Pages: 1897-1937
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:63:y:2008:i:4:p:1897-1937

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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Craig Doidge & G. Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stulz, 2008. "Why Do Foreign Firms Leave U.S. Equity Markets?," NBER Working Papers 14245, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Doidge, Craig & Karolyi, G. Andrew & Stulz, Rene, 2008. "Why Do Foreign Firms Leave U.S. Equity Markets? An Analysis of Deregistrations under SEC Exchange Act Rule 12h-6," Working Paper Series 2008-14, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Leyuan You and Brian Lucey, 2008. "An Empirical Study of Multiple Listings," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp273, IIIS. [Downloadable!]
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