Competition among Health Maintenance Organizations
AbstractWe develop a model of competition among health maintenance organizations (HMOs) to analyze the effects of market power, scale economies, and asymmetric knowledge of health risk on market outcomes. We find that competition among HMOs may, but need not, ensure socially preferred outcomes. Market power or scale economies can sometimes admit socially preferred outcomes when they would otherwise not arise. Asymmetric knowledge of health risk may or may not be constraining. When it is constraining, a variety of patterns of incomplete health insurance can arise, along with excessive or insufficient treatment and preventive care for either high-risk or low-risk individuals. Copyright (c) 1997 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
Volume (Year): 6 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/journals/JEMS/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Bradley Herring, 2010. "Suboptimal provision of preventive healthcare due to expected enrollee turnover among private insurers," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(4), pages 438-448.
- Glazer, Jacob & McGuire, Thomas G., 2011. "Gold and Silver health plans: Accommodating demand heterogeneity in managed competition," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 1011-1019.
- Laurence C. Baker & Kenneth S. Corts, 1995. "The Effects of HMOs on Conventional Insurance Premiums: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 5356, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Thomas G. McGuire & Jacob Glazer, 2000. "Optimal Risk Adjustment in Markets with Adverse Selection: An Application to Managed Care," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 1055-1071, September.
- Olivella, Pau & Vera-Hernandez, Marcos, 2007. "Competition among differentiated health plans under adverse selection," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 233-250, March.
- Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, 2013. "Minimum Coverage Regulation in Insurance Markets," Documentos de Trabajo 301, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Pau Olivella & Marcos Vera-Hernandez, 2010. "How complex are the contracts offered by health plans?," SERIEs, Spanish Economic Association, vol. 1(3), pages 305-323, July.
- Belli, Paolo, 2001. "How adverse selection affects the health insurance market," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2574, The World Bank.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.