1. Ching-to Albert Ma, 1994. "Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives," Papers 0047, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
   Other versions:
   • Ma, Ching-to Albert, 1994. "Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 3(1), pages 93-112, Spring.
2. David M. Cutler & Sarah J. Reber, 1998. "Paying For Health Insurance: The Trade-Off Between Competition And Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(2), pages 433-466, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • David M. Cutler & Sarah Reber, 1996. "Paying for Health Insurance: The Tradeoff between Competition and Adverse Selection," NBER Working Papers 5796, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. James R. Baumgardner, 1991. "The Interaction between Forms of Insurance Contract and Types of Technical Change in Medical Care," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(1), pages 36-53, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Rogerson, William P, 1994. "Choice of Treatment Intensities by a Nonprofit Hospital under Prospective Pricing," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 3(1), pages 7-51, Spring.
5. Pauly, Mark V., 1984. "Is cream-skimming a problem for the competitive medical market?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 87-95, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
7. Goldman, Dana P. & Hosek, Susan D. & Dixon, Lloyd S. & Sloss, Elizabeth M., 1995. "The effects of benefit design and managed care on health care costs," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 401-418, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Greenwald, Bruce C & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1986. "Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(2), pages 229-64, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. David Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser, 1998. "Adverse Selection in Health Insurance," Forum for Health Economics & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 1(1), pages 1056-1056. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 1998. "Adverse Selection in Health Insurance," NBER Chapters, in: Frontiers in Health Policy Research, volume 1, pages 1-32 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 1997. "Adverse Selection in Health Insurance," NBER Working Papers 6107, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E, 1998. "Competition between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 33-62, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Ellis, Randall P., 1998. "Creaming, skimping and dumping: provider competition on the intensive and extensive margins1," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 537-555, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. William E. Encinosa & David E. M. Sappington, 1997. "Competition among Health Maintenance Organizations," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(1), pages 129-150, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Mathias Kifmann, 2006. "Risk selection and complementary health insurance: The Swiss approach," International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 151-170, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Erik Schokkaert & Carine Van De Voorde, 2006. "Incentives for risk selection and omitted variables in the risk adjustment formula," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 83-84, pages 13, Juillet-D. [Downloadable!]
3. Ronald Eduardo Gómez Suárez, 2007. "Cream-Skimming And Risk Adjustment in Colombian Health Insurance System:: The Public Insurer Case," ARCHIVOS DE ECONOMÍA 004295, DEPARTAMENTO NACIONAL DE PLANEACIÓN. [Downloadable!]
4. David McAdams & Michael Schwarz, 2006. "Perverse Incentives in the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit," NBER Working Papers 12008, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Nazmi Sari, 2002. "Do competition and managed care improve quality?," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 11(7), pages 571-584. [Downloadable!]
6. Yujing Shen & Randall P. Ellis, 2002. "How profitable is risk selection? A comparison of four risk adjustment models," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 11(2), pages 165-174. [Downloadable!]
7. Philippe Chone & Ching-to Albert Ma, 2005. "Asymmetric Information from Physician Agency:Optimal Payment and Healthcare Quantity," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-006, Boston University - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Philippe Chone & Ching-to Albert Ma, 2006. "Asymmetric Information from Physician Agency: Optimal Payment and Healthcare Quantity," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-006, Boston University - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]