This paper introduces a theory of network incentives in managed health care. Participation in the plan's "network" confers an economic benefit on providers; in example, the plan expects compliance with its protocols. The network sets a target for the number of outpatient visits in an episode of care. A provider failing to satisfy the target may be penalized by the paln's attempt to direct patients to other providers within its network. There is an equilibrium in which every provider in the networlk uses the target.
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Paper provided by Boston University - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number
94.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C45 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Neural Networks and Related Topics I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
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