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Resources and culture in organizations

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  • Suraj Prasad
  • Marcus Tomaino

Abstract

We look at how an organization's level of resources interacts with its culture—that is, its shared beliefs and preferences. We consider an organization where workers exert effort to develop projects. These projects (a) have externalities for other members, (b) compete for funds when resources are scarce, and (c) can be implemented in various ways, which members have beliefs and preferences over. When resources are plenty, so that all feasible projects are funded, workers' efforts are independent of each other and a coherent culture is optimal. By contrast, when resources are scarce, competition across workers with diverging beliefs or preferences (competing cultures) can be optimal.

Suggested Citation

  • Suraj Prasad & Marcus Tomaino, 2020. "Resources and culture in organizations," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 854-872, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:29:y:2020:i:4:p:854-872
    DOI: 10.1111/jems.12388
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