Culture Clash: The Costs and Benefits of Homogeneity
AbstractThis paper develops an economic theory of the costs and benefits of corporate culture -- in the sense of shared beliefs and values -- in order to study the effects of 'culture clash' in mergers and acquisitions. I first use a simple analytical framework to show that shared beliefs lead to more delegation, less monitoring, higher utility (or satisfaction), higher execution effort (or motivation), faster coordination, less influence activities, and more communication, but also to less experimentation and less information collection. When two firms that are each internally homogenous but different from each other, merge, the above results translate to specific predictions how the change in homogeneity will affect firm behavior. The paper's predictions can also serve more in general as a test for the theory of culture as homogeneity of beliefs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Harvard Business School in its series Harvard Business School Working Papers with number 10-003.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2009
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Eric Van den Steen, 2010. "Culture Clash: The Costs and Benefits of Homogeneity," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(10), pages 1718-1738, October.
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