Well‐Informed Intermediaries In Strategic Communication
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DOI: j.1465-7295.2010.00306.x
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Li Hao & Wei Li, 2013. "Misinformation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54(1), pages 253-277, February.
- Fenglin Jia & Daner Sun & Qing Ma & Chee-Kit Looi, 2022. "Developing an AI-Based Learning System for L2 Learners’ Authentic and Ubiquitous Learning in English Language," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(23), pages 1-18, November.
- José M. Ferrer & M. Teresa Ortuño & Gregorio Tirado, 2020. "A New Ant Colony-Based Methodology for Disaster Relief," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(4), pages 1-23, April.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- M31 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Marketing
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