How could conditional cash transfer programme conditionalities reinforce vulnerability? Non‐compliers and policy implementation gaps in Uruguay's Family Allowances

Influential research shows that conditionalities could incentivize recipients of conditional cash transfer programmes (CCTs) to send their children to school and to regular health check‐ups. However, a growing literature is elucidating the risks of conditional transfers, from both a philosophical and an empirical perspective. This article highlights the varied deficits that have accompanied the implementation process in some Latin American countries, as well as the consequences that these deficits might have on the beneficiaries. In particular, it suggests that, rather than reducing vulnerability by improving access to services, conditionalities could be reinforcing vulnerability among non‐compliers if non‐compliance leads to the immediate suspension of the cash transfer and if this sanction is poorly implemented. While this hypothesis has gained attention and is part of both an academic and a political debate, empirical research around it is scarce. This article is an attempt to start filling this gap by focusing on the implementation process of conditionalities in a CCT programme in Uruguay (Family Allowances) and how this is experienced by a group of recipients who failed to comply with the conditionalities and were sanctioned with the suspension of the benefit. In particular, it identifies the main reasons why these beneficiaries did not comply, how they experience the sanction and how they managed—when they do—to apply for the benefit to be restored. Based on a qualitative design of in‐depth interviews, it provides empirical evidence to unpack causal relationships linking conditionalities to increased vulnerability among non‐compliers. Our findings offer evidence on the role played by the conditionalities in reinforcing vulnerability and the possible causal mechanisms that could be operating between both phenomena. This picture of policy implementation constraints that could lead conditionalities to reinforce vulnerability among recipients could be relevant to policy‐makers having to deal with non‐compliance and managing sanctions in CCTs.