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Optimal redistributive taxation when government's and agents' preferences differ

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Author Info
Blomquist, Soren
Micheletto, Luca
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 90 (2006)
Issue (Month): 6-7 (August)
Pages: 1215-1233
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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:90:y:2006:i:6-7:p:1215-1233

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Blomquist, Sören & Micheletto, Luca, 2003. "Age Related Optimal Income Taxation," Working Paper Series 2003:7, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Racionero, Maria del Mar, 2001. "Optimal Tax Mix with Merit Goods," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(4), pages 628-41, October.
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  3. Atkinson, A. B. & Stiglitz, J. E., 1976. "The design of tax structure: Direct versus indirect taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1-2), pages 55-75. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Sandmo, Agnar, 1983. "Ex Post Welfare Economics and the Theory of Merit Goods," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 50(197), pages 19-33, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Tobin, James, 1970. "On Limiting the Domain of Inequality," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(2), pages 263-77, October.
  6. Pollak, Robert A, 1969. "Conditional Demand Functions and Consumption Theory," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 83(1), pages 60-78, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, 2003. "Libertarian Paternalism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 175-179, May. [Downloadable!]
  8. Schroyen, Fred, 2005. "An alternative way to model merit good arguments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(5-6), pages 957-966, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. J. A. Mirrlees, 1976. "Optimal Tax Theory: A Synthesis," Working papers 176, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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  11. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Nava, Mario & Schroyen, Fred & Marchand, Maurice, 1996. "Optimal fiscal and public expenditure policy in a two-class economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 119-137, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Besley, Timothy, 1988. "A simple model for merit good arguments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 371-383, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael & Toumala, Matti, 1991. "Optimal non-linear income taxation for the alleviation of income poverty," Policy Research Working Paper Series 616, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Stern, Nicholas, 1982. "Optimum taxation with errors in administration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 181-211, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jukka Pirttilä & Sanna Tenhunen, 2005. "Pawns and Queens Revisited: Public Provision of Private Goods when Individuals make Mistakes," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Micheletto, Luca, 2009. "Optimal nonlinear redistributive taxation and public good provision in an economy with Veblen effects," Working Paper Series 2009:3, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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