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La gestion de las aguas subterraneas en el acuifero Mancha Occidental Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Iglesias, Eva
RESUMEN: En este artÃÂculo se aborda la problemática que plantea la recuperación del acuÃÂfero Mancha Occidental en el que existe una importante externalidad ambiental que se deriva de la relación entre las reservas de agua existentes en el acuÃÂfero y los humedales Tablas de Daimiel. Para ello, se desarrollan varios modelos de programación matemática que permiten evaluar distintos instrumentos de gestión para guiar la recuperación del acuÃÂfero a un estado sostenible. Los resultados obtenidos permiten al menos cuestionar la extendida regla de Gisser-Sánchez y revelan que las ganancias derivadas de la gestión óptima pueden ser significativas. En segundo lugar, las cuotas constantes por explotación se revelan como el instrumento menos eficiente tanto desde la perspectiva económica como ambiental. Además, se demuestra que un sistema de pagos aplicado como un instrumento compensador de un sistema de cuotas puede plantear conflictos con el paso del tiempo, ya que los pagos van a suponer una compensación cada vez menor de las pérdidas impuestas por las cuotas, a medida que el nivel freático se recupere. Por último, se demuestra que la gestión a través de un banco de aguas contribuirÃÂa a reconciliar los intereses de los agricultores con la conservación de los humedales. SUMMARY: This research focuses on the particular problem that emerges in overexploited aquifers when environmental externalities are present. This is the case of Mancha Occidental where environmental externalities derive from the interrelation of groundwater reserves and the preservation of Tablas de Daimiel wetlands. Several mathematical programming models are developed to evaluate alternative groundwater management policies aimed to assure the preservation of the wetlands. The results permit to argue that the Gisser-Sánchez rule, which states that gains derived from optimal management in groundwater are not significant, may be questionable. Moreover, the results show that differences in groundwater management policies are strongly determinant. In the first place, it has to be emphasized that a fix quota system could result in significant inefficiencies, both from the agricultural sector perspective and from the environmental perspective. Secondly, a payment system implemented to compensate the application of water quotas might cause undesired long term effects, as its relative compensation value will diminish as the aquifer's recovery level increases. Finally, the results show that a water banking system may contribute to reconcile farmers´ interest and the preservation of the wetlands.
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Article provided by Spanish Association of Agricultural Economists in its journal Economia Agraria y Recursos Naturales .
Volume (Year): 2 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages:
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Handle: RePEc:ags:earnsa:28755Contact details of provider: Postal: Universidad del Pa�s Vasco; DFAE II; Avenida Lehendakari Aguirre, 83; 48015 Bilbao; Spain Phone: +34 94 6013783 Fax: + 34 94 6013774 Email: Web page: http://www.upv.es/aeea/index.htm More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: groundwater management ; environmental externalities ; water bank ; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy ; Q25 ; References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
H. Scott Gordon, 1954.
"The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bill Provencher, 1993.
"A Private Property Rights Regime to Replenish a Groundwater Aquifer ,"
Land Economics ,
University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 69(4), pages 325-340.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Talbot Page, 1997.
"On the Problem of Achieving Efficiency and Equity, Intergenerationally ,"
Land Economics ,
University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 73(4), pages 580-596.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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