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Evolution and Game Theory

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  • Larry Samuelson
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    Abstract

    Research in noncooperative game theory has focused attention on two questions: Should we expect equilibrium play? If so, which of the multiple equilibria that arise in many games should we expect? This paper summarizes recent approaches to these questions that have been based on evolutionary models.

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    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/0895330027256
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.

    Volume (Year): 16 (2002)
    Issue (Month): 2 (Spring)
    Pages: 47-66

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    Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:16:y:2002:i:2:p:47-66

    Note: DOI: 10.1257/0895330027256
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    References

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    1. Gale, John & Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1995. "Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 56-90.
    2. Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L. & Gale, J., 1993. "Learning to be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game," Working papers 9325, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    3. Arthur J Robson & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1999. "Efficient Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Random Matching," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2112, David K. Levine.
    4. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2000. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1127-1150, September.
    5. Battalio, Raymond & Samuelson, Larry & Van Huyck, John, 2001. "Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(3), pages 749-64, May.
    6. Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
    7. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September.
    8. George J. Mailath, 1998. "Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(3), pages 1347-1374, September.
    9. Boylan Richard T., 1995. "Continuous Approximation of Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 615-625, August.
    10. Samuelson, Larry, 2001. "Analogies, Adaptation, and Anomalies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 320-366, April.
    11. Binmore Kenneth G. & Samuelson Larry & Vaughan Richard, 1995. "Musical Chairs: Modeling Noisy Evolution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 1-35, October.
    12. Armen A. Alchian, 1950. "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 211.
    13. Abreu, Dilip & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1988. "The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1259-81, November.
    14. Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L. & Vaughan, R., 1993. "Musical Chairs: Modelling Noisy Evolution," Working papers 9324, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    15. Matsui, Akihiko, 1991. "Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 245-258, August.
    16. Akihiko Matsui, 1989. "Cheap Talk and Cooperation in the Society," Discussion Papers 848, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    17. Roth, Alvin E. & Erev, Ido, 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 164-212.
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    Cited by:
    1. Conlon, John R., 2003. "Hope springs eternal: learning and the stability of cooperation in short horizon repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 35-65, September.
    2. Joan Luft & Michael Shields, 2002. "Zimmerman's contentious conjectures: describing the present and prescribing the future of empirical management accounting research," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(4), pages 795-803.
    3. Martin Kaae Jensen & Alexandros Rigos, 2012. "Evolutionary Games with Group Selection," Discussion Papers 13-05, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    4. Ulrich Witt, 2013. "The Future of Evolutionary Economics: Why Modalities Matter," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2013-09, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
    5. Alexis Anagnostopoulos & Omar Licandro & Italo Bove & Karl Schlag, 2006. "An Evolutionary Theory of Inflation Inertia," Economics Working Papers ECO2006/33, European University Institute.
    6. Marco Stimolo, 2012. "Individual autonomy in evolutionary game theory: defending Sugden against Ross’s accusation of eliminativism," International Review of Economics, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 67-80, March.
    7. Levy, Moshe, 2005. "Is risk-aversion hereditary?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1-2), pages 157-168, February.
    8. Tassos Patokos, 2014. "Introducing Disappointment Dynamics and Comparing Behaviors in Evolutionary Games: Some Simulation Results," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 5(1), pages 1-25, January.
    9. Hardy Hanappi, 2008. "The concept of choice: why and how innovative behaviour is not just stochastic," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 275-289, April.
    10. Kolstad, Ivar, 2007. "The evolution of social norms: With managerial implications," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 58-72, February.
    11. Gilad D. Aharonovitz & Nathan Skuza & Faysal Fahs, 2009. "Can Integrity Replace Institutions? Theory and Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 2730, CESifo Group Munich.
    12. Shahi, Chander & Kant, Shashi, 2007. "An evolutionary game-theoretic approach to the strategies of community members under Joint Forest Management regime," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(7), pages 763-775, April.
    13. Geoffrey Hodgson & Thorbjørn Knudsen, 2008. "In search of general evolutionary principles: Why Darwinism is too important to be left to the biologists," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 51-69, April.
    14. Gilad Aharonovitz & Nathan Skuza & Faysal Fahs, 2008. "Can Integrity Replace Institutions? Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 2009-06, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
    15. Alberto Locarno, 2012. "Monetary policy in a model with misspecified, heterogeneous and ever-changing expectations," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 888, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    16. Guth, Werner & Pull, Kerstin, 2004. "Will equity evolve?: an indirect evolutionary approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 273-282, March.
    17. James D. Montgomery, 2010. "Intergenerational Cultural Transmission as an Evolutionary Game," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 115-36, November.
    18. Ulrich Witt, 2008. "What is specific about evolutionary economics?," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 18(5), pages 547-575, October.
    19. Geoffrey Hodgson & Kainan Huang, 2012. "Evolutionary game theory and evolutionary economics: are they different species?," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 345-366, April.

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