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Evolution and Game Theory

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Author Info
Larry Samuelson
Abstract

This paper reviews the case for an evolutionary approach to problems of economic analysis, ranging from the details of individual firm behavior in the short run through industrial dynamics to the historical evolution of institutions and technologies. We draw upon a substantial body of recent research contributions. We characterize micro behavior as governed by skills and routines that are shaped by learning and selection. We then consider major areas of application of evolutionary thinking, including the analysis of competitive processes in technologically dynamic industries and the evolution of institutions and technologies.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.

Volume (Year): 16 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (Spring)
Pages: 47-66
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Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:16:y:2002:i:2:p:47-66

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Boylan Richard T., 1995. "Continuous Approximation of Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 615-625, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. repec:att:wimass:199325 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Battalio, Raymond & Samuelson, Larry & Van Huyck, John, 2001. "Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(3), pages 749-64, May.
  5. Abreu, Dilip & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1988. "The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1259-81, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Binmore Kenneth G. & Samuelson Larry & Vaughan Richard, 1995. "Musical Chairs: Modeling Noisy Evolution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 1-35, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Akihiko Matsui, 1989. "Cheap Talk and Cooperation in the Society," Discussion Papers 848, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  8. Robson, Arthur J. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 1996. "Efficient Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Random Matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 65-92, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2000. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1127-1150, September.
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  10. George J. Mailath, 1998. "Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(3), pages 1347-1374, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Samuelson, Larry, 2001. "Analogies, Adaptation, and Anomalies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 320-366, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Armen A. Alchian, 1950. "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 211. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. repec:att:wimass:199324 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Matsui, Akihiko, 1991. "Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 245-258, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Yong Gwan Kim & Joel Sobel, 1992. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 92-01, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Alexis Anagnostopoulos & Italo Bove & Karl Schlag & Omar Licandro, 2006. "An Evolutionary Theory of Inflation Inertia," Working Papers 2006-25, FEDEA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Joan Luft & Michael Shields, 2002. "Zimmerman's contentious conjectures: describing the present and prescribing the future of empirical management accounting research," European Accounting Review, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 11(4), pages 795-803, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hardy Hanappi, 2008. "The concept of choice: why and how innovative behaviour is not just stochastic," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 275-289, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Ulrich Witt, 2008. "What is specific about evolutionary economics?," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 18(5), pages 547-575, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Geoffrey Hodgson & Thorbjørn Knudsen, 2008. "In search of general evolutionary principles: Why Darwinism is too important to be left to the biologists," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 51-69, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.


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