Does eeasoning enhance learning?
AbstractUtilizing the well-known Ultimatum Game, this note presents the following phenomenon. If we start with simple stimulus-response agents, learning through naive reinforcement, and then grant them some introspective capabilities, we get outcomes that are not closer but farther away from the fully introspective game-theoretic approach. The cause of this is the following: there is an asymmetry in the information that agents can deduce from their experience, and this leads to a bias in their learning process.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 185.
Date of creation: Oct 1996
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Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/
Ultimatum game; game theory; reasoning; reinforcement learning; Leex;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1998-09-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-CMP-1998-10-08 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-EVO-1998-09-14 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-1998-09-14 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-1998-09-14 (Game Theory)
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Levine's Working Paper Archive
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- repec:att:wimass:9325 is not listed on IDEAS
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