This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

On the Behavior of Proposers in Ultimatum Games

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
T. Brenner
N.J. Vriend

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We demonstrate that one should not expect convergence of the proposals to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium offer in standard ultimatum games. First, imposing strict experimental control of the behavior of the receiving players and focusing on the behavior of the proposers, we show experimentally that proposers do not learn to make the expected-payoff- maximizing offer. Second, considering a range of learning theories (from optimal to boundedly rational), we explain that this is an inherent feature of the learning task faced by the proposers, and we provide some insights into the actual learning behavior of the experimental subjects. This explanation for the lack of convergence to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in ultimatum games complements most alternative explanations.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group in its series Papers on Economics and Evolution with number 2003-08.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Aug 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:esi:evopap:2003-08

Note: The paper will be emailed on request. Please contact Inken Poszner (poszner@econ.mpg.de)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Kahlaische Strasse 10, D-07745 Jena
Phone: +49-3641-68 65
Fax: +49-3641-68 69 90
Web page: http://www.econ.mpg.de/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.econ.mpg.de/english/research/EVO/discuss.php

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Inken Poßner).

Related research
Keywords: Ultimatum game; Non-equilibrium behavior; Laboratory experiment; Multi- armed bandit; Optimal learning; Gittins index; Bounded rationality;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Selten, Reinhard & Stoecker, Rolf, 1986. "End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner's Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 47-70, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Guth, Werner & Tietz, Reinhard, 1990. "Ultimatum bargaining behavior : A survey and comparison of experimental results," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 417-449, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. repec:att:wimass:199325 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Gary E. Bolton & Rami Zwick & Elena Katok, 1998. "Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 269-299. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Brezzi, Monica & Lai, Tze Leung, 2002. "Optimal learning and experimentation in bandit problems," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 87-108, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Bergemann, Dirk & Valimaki, Juuso, 2001. "Stationary multi-choice bandit problems," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(10), pages 1585-1594, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Thaler, Richard H, 1988. "The Ultimatum Game," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 195-206, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Forsythe Robert & Horowitz Joel L. & Savin N. E. & Sefton Martin, 1994. "Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 347-369, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Stephen L. Cheung, 2008. "Using Mobile Phone Messaging as a Response Medium in Classroom Experiments," Journal of Economic Education, Helen Dwight Reid Foundation, vol. 39(1), pages 51-67. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All RePEc services are meant to be be free forever, as they are all run by volunteers.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-12.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.