Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty

Contents:

Author Info

  • Stephen Morris
  • Dirk Bergemann

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.97.2.125
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/may07/p07044_app.pdf
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 97 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 125-130

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:97:y:2007:i:2:p:125-130

Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.2.125
Contact details of provider:
Email:
Web page: http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2000. "Efficient Auctions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(2), pages 341-388, May.
  2. Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1987. "Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1391-1402, November.
  3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1561R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised May 2007.
  4. Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava, 1990. "Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 285-299, April.
  5. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September.
  6. Guillermo Caruana & Liran Einav, 2008. "A Theory of Endogenous Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(1), pages 99-116.
  7. Gale, Douglas, 1995. "Dynamic Coordination Games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 1-18, January.
  8. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
  9. repec:wop:humbsf:2000-72 is not listed on IDEAS
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009. "Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000109, David K. Levine.
  2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1818, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. Levent Ulku, 2010. "Monotone Implementation," Working Papers 1004, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:97:y:2007:i:2:p:125-130. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros) or (Michael P. Albert).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.