An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 97 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Other versions of this item:
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000001000, UCLA Department of Economics.
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2006.
"Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms,"
122247000000001194, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1561R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised May 2007.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1561, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981.
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447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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"Dynamic Coordiantion Games,"
13, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2000.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 115(2), pages 341-388, May.
- P. Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 1998. "Efficient Auctions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1857, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- repec:wop:humbsf:2000-72 is not listed on IDEAS
- Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September.
- Guillermo Caruana & Liran Einav, 2008. "A Theory of Endogenous Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(1), pages 99-116.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009.
"Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
814577000000000109, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011.
"Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1818, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Levent Ulku, 2010. "Monotone Implementation," Working Papers 1004, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
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