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English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem

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  • Dubra, Juan
  • Echenique, Federico
  • Manelli, Alejandro

Abstract

We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, one for economies with n goods and n factors, and one for non-square economies. Similar assumptions and methods underlie these seemingly unrelated results.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 8218.

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Date of creation: 15 Nov 2007
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8218

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Keywords: English auctions; Stolper-Samuelson; single crossing;

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  1. Chipman, John S, 1969. "Factor Price Equalization and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 10(3), pages 399-406, October.
  2. Ethier, Wilfred J., 1984. "Higher dimensional issues in trade theory," Handbook of International Economics, in: R. W. Jones & P. B. Kenen (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 3, pages 131-184 Elsevier.
  3. Oleksii Birulin & Sergei Izmalkov, 2009. "On Effciency of the English Auction," Working Papers w0139, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  4. Krishna, Vijay, 2003. "Asymmetric English auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 261-288, October.
  5. Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Discussion Papers 447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Robert Wilson, 1998. "Sequential equilibria of asymmetric ascending auctions: The case of log-normal distributions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 433-440.
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Cited by:
  1. Federico Echenique & Alejandro Manelli, 2003. "Comparative Statics, English Auctions, and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem," GE, Growth, Math methods 0309005, EconWPA.
  2. Andrés Pereyra, 2003. "Competencia en telefonía móvil en Uruguay: diseño de subastas, contratos y marco institucional," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0103, Department of Economics - dECON.
  3. Laurent Lamy, 2009. "Ascending auctions: some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discounts," Working Papers halshs-00575076, HAL.
  4. Laurent Lamy, 2009. "Ascending auctions: some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discounts," PSE Working Papers halshs-00575076, HAL.
  5. Marisa Bucheli & Máximo Rossi, 2003. "El grado de conformidad con la vida: evidencia para las mujeres del Gran Montevideo," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 1003, Department of Economics - dECON.
  6. Carlos Casacuberta & Ianina Rossi & Máximo Rossi, 2003. "El arte y el éxito: un matrimonio incómodo," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0303, Department of Economics - dECON.
  7. Cecilia González & Máximo Rossi, 2003. "Participación femenina en el mercado de trabajo: efectos sobre la distribución del ingreso en el Uruguay," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 1203, Department of Economics - dECON.
  8. Oleksii Birulin & Sergei Izmalkov, 2009. "On Effciency of the English Auction," Working Papers w0139, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).

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