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Dynamic Auctions: Uniqueness and Robustness to Private Information

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Dirk Bergemann
Stephen Morris

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 321307000000000771.

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Date of creation: 26 Jan 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000771

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  1. Gale, Douglas, 1995. "Dynamic Coordination Games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 1-18, January.
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  2. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2000. "Efficient Auctions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(2), pages 341-388, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Guillermo Caruana & Liran Einav, 2008. "A Theory of Endogenous Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 75(1), pages 99-116, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava, 1990. "Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 285-299, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001194, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1987. "Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1391-1402, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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