IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/wly/quante/v7y2016i1p1-36.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Communication with multiple senders: An experiment

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2021. "An experiment on deception, reputation and trust," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(3), pages 821-853, September.
  2. Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Patacchini, Eleonora, 2020. "Social Groups and the Effectiveness of Protests," CEPR Discussion Papers 14385, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2018. "Communication with evidence in the lab," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 139-165.
  4. Albertazzi, Andrea & Ploner, Matteo & Vaccari, Federico, 2021. "Welfare in Experimental News Markets," SocArXiv 5j2w8, Center for Open Science.
  5. Gurdal, Mehmet Y. & Ozdogan, Ayca & Saglam, Ismail, 2013. "Cheap talk with simultaneous versus sequential messages," MPRA Paper 45727, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Agranov, Marina & Cotton, Christopher & Tergiman, Chloe, 2020. "Persistence of power: Repeated multilateral bargaining with endogenous agenda setting authority," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
  7. Jehiel, Philippe & Singh, Juni, 2021. "Multi-state choices with aggregate feedback on unfamiliar alternatives," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 1-24.
  8. Chloe Tergiman & Marie Claire Villeval, 2023. "The Way People Lie in Markets: Detectable vs. Deniable Lies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(6), pages 3340-3357, June.
  9. Lafky, Jonathan & Wilson, Alistair J., 2020. "Experimenting with incentives for information transmission: Quantity versus quality," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 314-331.
  10. Sobel, Joel, 2013. "Ten possible experiments on communication and deception," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt53w1f0w4, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  11. Battaglini, Marco & Makarov, Uliana, 2014. "Cheap talk with multiple audiences: An experimental analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 147-164.
  12. Chloe Tergiman & Marie Claire Villeval, 2019. "The Way People Lie in Markets," Working Papers 1927, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
  13. Siqi Pan & Xin Zhao, 2023. "Commitment and cheap talk in search deterrence," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(2), pages 325-359, June.
  14. Lu, Shih En, 2017. "Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 177-208.
  15. Wonsuk Chung & Rick Harbaugh, 2019. "Biased recommendations from biased and unbiased experts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 520-540, June.
  16. Ambrus, Attila & Lu, Shih En, 2014. "Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 174-189.
  17. Sobel, Joel, 2013. "Ten possible experiments on communication and deception," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 408-413.
  18. Esra E. Bayindir & Mehmet Y. Gurdal & Ayca Ozdogan & Ismail Saglam, 2020. "Cheap Talk Games with Two-Senders and Different Modes of Communication," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-22, April.
  19. Minozzi, William & Woon, Jonathan, 2019. "The limited value of a second opinion: Competition and exaggeration in experimental cheap talk games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 144-162.
  20. Wu, Wenhao & Ye, Bohan, 2023. "Competition in persuasion: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 72-89.
  21. Sookie Xue Zhang & Ralph-Christopher Bayer, 2023. "Delegation based on cheap talk," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 94(2), pages 333-361, February.
  22. Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper, 2020. "Managerial Leadership, Truth-Telling, and Efficient Coordination," Working Papers 1211, Barcelona School of Economics.
  23. Battaglini, Marco & Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung & Wang, Joseph Tao-Yi, 2019. "The Informational Theory of Legislative Committees: An Experimental Analysis," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 113(1), pages 55-76, February.
  24. Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper, 2018. "Truth Be Told An Experimental Study of Communication and Centralization," Working Papers 1046, Barcelona School of Economics.
  25. Jonathan Lafky & Alistair J. Wilson, 2015. "Quality vs. Quantity in Information Transmission: Theory and Experimental Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 5426, CESifo.
  26. Wonsuk Chung & Rick Harbaugh, 2012. "Biased Recommendations," Working Papers 2012-02, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  27. Plott, Charles R. & Llewellyn, Morgan, 2015. "Information transfer and aggregation in an uninformed committee: A model for the selection and use of biased expert advice," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 208-223.
  28. Ertac, Seda & Koçkesen, Levent & Ozdemir, Duygu, 2016. "The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 24-45.
  29. Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi, 2015. "An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 114-144.
  30. Charness, Gary & Gneezy, Uri & Rasocha, Vlastimil, 2021. "Experimental methods: Eliciting beliefs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 234-256.
  31. Groseclose, Tim, 2021. "Do humans rationally discount biased signals? Evidence from the Crawford-Sobel Game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 306-317.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.