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Comparing Public Procurement Auctions

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Oleksii Birulin & Sergei Izmalkov, 2022. "On advance payments in tenders with budget constrained contractors," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(4), pages 733-762, December.
  2. Gianmarco Daniele & Tommaso Giommoni, 2019. "Corruption under Austerity," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19131, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  3. Ottorino Chillemi & Stefano Galavotti, 2025. "Optimal procurement auctions with audit," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 79(3), pages 993-1054, May.
  4. Clara Calini & Alessandra Catenazzo & Elisabetta Iossa, 2025. "Using Multiple Tools to Enhance Competition in Public Procurement," CEIS Research Paper 594, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 25 Feb 2025.
  5. Cappelletti, Matilde & Giuffrida, Leonardo M., 2021. "Procuring survival," ZEW Discussion Papers 21-093, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  6. Indranil Chakraborty & Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2021. "Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(1), pages 179-206, March.
  7. Carnehl, Christoph & Weiergraeber, Stefan, 2023. "Bidder asymmetries in procurement auctions: Efficiency vs. information – Evidence from railway passenger services," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
  8. Michele Fioretti, 2022. "Caring or Pretending to Care? Social Impact, Firms' Objectives, and Welfare (former title: Social Responsibility and Firm's Objectives)," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03393065, HAL.
  9. Antonio Estache & Renaud Foucart & Tomas Serebrisky, 2022. "When can Lotteries improve Public Procurement Processes?," Working Papers ECARES 2022-22, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  10. Emery, Thomas & Mélon, Lela & Spruk, Rok, 2023. "Does e-procurement matter for economic growth? Subnational evidence from Australia," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 318-334.
  11. B. Cesi & M. Lorusso, 2020. "Collusion in public procurement: the role of subcontracting," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 37(1), pages 251-265, April.
  12. Joachim Freyberger & Bradley J. Larsen, 2022. "Identification in ascending auctions, with an application to digital rights management," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), pages 505-543, May.
  13. Li Li & Jiayong Liu & Peng Jia & Rongfeng Zheng, 2020. "PSPAB: Privacy-preserving average procurement bidding system with double-spending checking," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(10), pages 1-17, October.
  14. Toshihiro Tsuchihashi, 2020. "Reserve price signaling in first-price auctions with an uncertain number of bidders," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(4), pages 1081-1103, December.
  15. Julian di Giovanni & Manuel García-Santana & Priit Jeenas & Enrique Moral-Benitoz & Josep Pijoan-Mas, 2022. "Government Procurement and Access to Credit: Firm Dynamics and Aggregate Implications," Working Papers 2233, Banco de España.
  16. Matilde Cappelletti & Leonardo M. Giuffrida, 2024. "Targeted Bidders in Government Tenders," CESifo Working Paper Series 11142, CESifo.
  17. Julian di Giovanni & Manuel García-Santana & Priit Jeenas & Enrique Moral-Benito & Josep Pijoan-Mas, 2022. "Buy Big or Buy Small? Procurement Policies, Firms' Financing, and the Macroeconomy," Staff Reports 1006, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  18. Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Gabriele Rovigatti, 2022. "Supplier selection and contract enforcement: Evidence from performance bonding," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 980-1019, November.
  19. Birulin, Oleksii, 2020. "Optimality of simple procurement auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
  20. Jinook Jeong & Hyunwoo Lee & Jung Jae Kim, 2024. "An econometric identification of abnormally low bids in the procurement market: discriminant analysis," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 51(1), pages 211-234, March.
  21. Păunescu, Vlad & Iliescu, Alexandru-Iulian & Sălăgean, Tudor & Şuba, Elemer-Emanuel & Nap, Mircea-Emil, 2024. "An analysis of strategic goals and public procurement strategy regarding the implementation of The National Program for Land Registration in Romania," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
  22. Rodrigo Carril, 2021. "Rules versus discretion in public procurement," Economics Working Papers 1765, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  23. Bedri Kamil Onur Tas, 2020. "Effect of public procurement regulation on competition and cost-effectiveness," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 59-77, August.
  24. Feyza G. Sahinyazan & Marie‐Ève Rancourt & Vedat Verter, 2021. "Improving Transportation Procurement in the Humanitarian Sector: A Data‐driven Approach for Abnormally Low Bid Detection," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(4), pages 1082-1109, April.
  25. Giuseppe Francesco Gori & Patrizia Lattarulo & Marco Mariani & Laura Razzolini, 2024. "The Expediting Effect of Monitoring on Infrastructural Works. A Regression-Discontinuity Approach with Multiple Assignment Variables," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 10(1), pages 197-224, March.
  26. Oliver Kirchkamp & J. Philipp Reiß, 2019. "Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and boundedly rational bidders: theory and experiment," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1001-1031, December.
  27. Antonio Estache & Renaud Foucart & Tomas Serebrisky, 2024. "Can Lotteries help fix Procurement Failures? A Review of Theory and Evidence," Working Papers ECARES 2024-18, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  28. Giuseppe Francesco Gori & Patrizia Lattarulo & Marco Mariani, 2021. "The Expediting Effect of Monitoring on Infrastructural Works. A Regression-Discontinuity Approach with Multiple Assignment Variables," Papers 2102.09625, arXiv.org.
  29. Carla Carlucci & Cristina Giorgiantonio & Tommaso Orlando, 2019. "Public works in Italy: time to completion and its determinants," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 538, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  30. Martimort, David & Arve, Malin, 2023. "Auctioning Long-Term Projects under Financial Constraints," TSE Working Papers 23-1469, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised May 2024.
  31. Cappelletti, Matilde & Giuffrida, Leonardo M., 2022. "Targeted bidders in government tenders," ZEW Discussion Papers 22-030, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  32. Barkley, Aaron & Groeger, Joachim R. & Miller, Robert A., 2021. "Bidding frictions in ascending auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 223(2), pages 376-400.
  33. Cristián Hernández & Daniel Quint & Christopher Turansick, 2020. "Estimation in English auctions with unobserved heterogeneity," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 868-904, September.
  34. Bucciol, Alessandro & Camboni, Riccardo & Valbonesi, Paola, 2020. "Purchasing medical devices: The role of buyer competence and discretion," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
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