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Citations for "The Agent-Agents Problem: Payment by Relative Output"

by Carmichael, H Lorne

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  1. Robert Dur & Jan Tichem, 2015. "Altruism and Relational Incentives in the Workplace," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(3), pages 485-500, 09.
  2. Matthias Kräkel, 2006. "Zur Reform der Professorenbesoldung in Deutschland," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 7(1), pages 105-126, 02.
  3. Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné & Olivier Cadot, 1997. "Career Concerns and the Acquisition of Firm-Specific Skills," CIG Working Papers FS IV 97-19, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  4. Francine Lafontaine & Kathryn L. Shaw, 2001. "Targeting Managerial Control: Evidence from Franchising," NBER Working Papers 8416, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier.
  6. Lazear, Edward P, 1997. "Incentives in Basic Research," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages S167-97, January.
  7. Gadi Barlevy & Derek Neal, 2012. "Pay for Percentile," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(5), pages 1805-31, August.
  8. W Bentley Macleod, . "A Note on the Optimality of Bonus Pay," Canadian International Labour Network Working Papers 41, McMaster University.
  9. Edward P. Lazear, 1986. "Incentive Contracts," NBER Working Papers 1917, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Shasikanta Nandeibam, 1994. "A free-rider problem with a free-riding principal," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 227-250, December.
  11. Dur, Robert & Non, Arjan & Roelfsema, Hein, 2010. "Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 676-686, August.
  12. Kosmas Marinakis & Theofanis Tsoulouhas, 2006. "Are Tournaments Optimal over Piece Rates under Limited Liability for the Principal?," Working Paper Series 009, North Carolina State University, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006.
  13. Kristoffer W. Eriksen & Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2011. "Tournaments with Prize‐setting Agents," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 113(3), pages 729-753, 09.
  14. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction
    [Strategie in Turnieren – eine Einführung]
    ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  15. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret E. Slade, 1998. "Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision," NBER Working Papers 6544, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Sirmans, G. Stacy & Sirmans, C. F. & Turnbull, Geoffrey K., 1999. "Prices, incentives and choice of management form," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 173-195, March.
  17. Lazear, Edward, 2003. "Output-Based Pay: Incentives, Retention or Sorting?," IZA Discussion Papers 761, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  18. Tsoulouhas, Theofanis, 1999. "Do tournaments solve the two-sided moral hazard problem?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 275-294, November.
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