IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login

Citations for "The Agent-Agents Problem: Payment by Relative Output"

by Carmichael, H Lorne

For a complete description of this item, click here. For a RSS feed for citations of this item, click here.
as in new window

  1. Matthias Kräkel, 2006. "Zur Reform der Professorenbesoldung in Deutschland," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 7(1), pages 105-126, 02.
  2. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction
    [Strategie in Turnieren – eine Einführung]
    ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  3. Gadi Barlevy & Derek Neal, 2011. "Pay for Percentile," NBER Working Papers 17194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Dur, Robert & Non, Arjan & Roelfsema, Hein, 2010. "Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 676-686, August.
  5. Edward P. Lazear, 1996. "Incentives in Basic Research," NBER Working Papers 5444, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Marinakis, Kosmas & Tsoulouhas, Theofanis, 2013. "Are tournaments optimal over piece rates under limited liability for the principal?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 223-237.
  7. Sirmans, G. Stacy & Sirmans, C. F. & Turnbull, Geoffrey K., 1999. "Prices, incentives and choice of management form," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 173-195, March.
  8. W Bentley Macleod, . "A Note on the Optimality of Bonus Pay," Canadian International Labour Network Working Papers 41, McMaster University.
  9. Kristoffer W. Eriksen & Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2011. "Tournaments with Prize‐setting Agents," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 113(3), pages 729-753, 09.
  10. Sinclair-Desgagne, Bernard & Cadot, Olivier, 2000. "Career Concerns and the Acquisition of Firm-Specific Skills," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 204-217, September.
  11. repec:dgr:uvatin:2008080 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Francine Lafontaine & Kathryn L. Shaw, 2005. "Targeting Managerial Control: Evidence from Franchising," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(1), pages 131-150, Spring.
  13. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier.
  14. Edward P. Lazear, 1986. "Incentive Contracts," NBER Working Papers 1917, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Shasikanta Nandeibam, 1994. "A free-rider problem with a free-riding principal," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 227-250, December.
  16. Lazear, Edward, 2003. "Output-Based Pay: Incentives, Retention or Sorting?," IZA Discussion Papers 761, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  17. Dur, Robert & Tichem, Jan, 2013. "Altruism and Relational Incentives in the Workplace," IZA Discussion Papers 7363, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  18. Tsoulouhas, Theofanis, 1999. "Do tournaments solve the two-sided moral hazard problem?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 275-294, November.
  19. repec:dgr:uvatin:20080080 is not listed on IDEAS
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.