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Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Bochet, Olivier, 2007. "Switching from complete to incomplete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(6), pages 735-748, August.
  2. Dennis L. Gärtner, 2022. "Corporate Leniency in a Dynamic World: The Preemptive Push of an Uncertain Future," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(1), pages 119-146, March.
  3. Motchenkova, Evgenia, 2008. "Determination of optimal penalties for antitrust violations in a dynamic setting," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 189(1), pages 269-291, August.
  4. Leliefeld, D. & Motchenkova, E., 2007. "To Protect in Order to Serve : Adverse Effects of Leniency Programs in View of Industry Asymmetry," Other publications TiSEM cdc81d9b-34c3-4e1c-85b8-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  5. Dennis Sánchez Navarro, 2013. "Eficacia y asimetrías de los programas de delación en un contexto multimercado: un análisis del caso colombiano en el marco del TLC con Estados Unidos," Estudios Económicos SIC 10905, Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio.
  6. Yusupova, Guzel', 2013. "The program of exemption from punishment in antitrust policy: empirical assessment of the problem," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, pages 143-160, December.
  7. Reinhold Philipp, 2018. "Die Selbstanzeige als Element des Wirtschaftsverkehrs: Anmerkungen zum Buch von Viviana E. Thompson," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 69(1), pages 457-461, July.
  8. Joe Chen & Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., 2005. "The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-358, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  9. Agisilaou, Panayiotis, 2012. "Keep to sustain or keep to exploit? Why firms keep hard evidence," MPRA Paper 39109, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Marvão, Catarina, 2014. "Heterogeneous Penalties and Private Information," Konkurrensverket Working Paper Series in Law and Economics 2014:1, Konkurrensverket (Swedish Competition Authority).
  11. Chen, Zhiqi & Ghosh, Subhadip & Ross, Thomas W., 2015. "Denying leniency to cartel instigators: Costs and benefits," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 19-29.
  12. Ghebrihiwet, N. & Motchenkova, E.I., 2010. "Leniency programs in the presence of judicial errors," Serie Research Memoranda 0008, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
  13. Houba Harold & Motchenkova Evgenia & Wen Quan, 2015. "The Effects of Leniency on Cartel Pricing," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 351-389, July.
  14. Marvao, Catarina, 2014. "Heterogeneous Penalties and Private Information," SITE Working Paper Series 29, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics.
  15. Anthony Gray & Bonnie T. Nguyen & Andrew Wait, 2013. "The Prodigal Corporation: an Analysis on the Effectiveness of the ACCC's Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(1), pages 38-51, March.
  16. Shastitko, Andrey (Шаститко, Андрей) & Pavlova, Natalia (Павлова, Наталья), 2015. "Program for Smoothening Punishment for Participating in a Cartel: The Problematic Field, and the Effects of Structural Alternatives [Программа Ослабления Наказания За Участие В Картеле: Проблемное ," Published Papers mn32, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
  17. Jochem, Annabelle & Parrotta, Pierpaolo & Valletta, Giacomo, 2020. "The impact of the 2002 reform of the EU leniency program on cartel outcomes," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
  18. Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen, 2009. "The Effects of Leniency on Maximal Cartel Pricing," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-081/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  19. Gyuzel Yusupova, 2013. "Leniency program and cartel deterrence in Russia: effects assessment," HSE Working papers WP BRP 06/PA/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
  20. Evgenia MOTCHENKOVA & Daniel LELIEFELD, 2010. "Adverse Effects Of Corporate Leniency Programs In View Of Industry Asymmetry," Journal of Applied Economic Sciences, Spiru Haret University, Faculty of Financial Management and Accounting Craiova, vol. 5(2(12)/Sum), pages 114-128.
  21. Palm, F.C. & Gengenbach, C. & Urbain, J.R.Y.J., 2004. "Panel unit root tests in the presence of cross-1 sectional dependencies: comparison and implications for medelling," Research Memorandum 039, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  22. Marcel Boyer & Anne Catherine Faye & Rachidi Kotchoni, 2017. "Challenges and Pitfalls in Cartel Policy and Fining," CIRANO Working Papers 2017s-20, CIRANO.
  23. Joseph E. Harrington Jr. & Myong-Hun Chang, 2015. "When Can We Expect a Corporate Leniency Program to Result in Fewer Cartels?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(2), pages 417-449.
  24. Patrice Bougette & Christian Montet & Florent Venayre, 2006. "L'efficacité économique des programmes de clémence," Post-Print halshs-00476807, HAL.
  25. Tim Reuter, 2012. "Private antitrust enforcement revisited: The role of private incentives to report evidence to the antitrust authority," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2012-04, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
  26. Motta, Alberto & Burlando, Alfredo, 2007. "Self reporting reduces corruption in law enforcement," MPRA Paper 5332, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 23 Jun 2007.
  27. Feess, E. & Walzl, M., 2008. "Quid-pro-quo or winner-takes-it-all? : an analysis of corporate leniency programs and lessons to learn for EU and US policies," Research Memorandum 057, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  28. Agisilaou, Panayiotis, 2011. "Keep to sustain or keep to exploit? Why firms keep hard evidence," MPRA Paper 30963, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  29. Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen, 2008. "Maximal Cartel Pricing and Leniency Programs," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-120/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  30. Sánchez Navarro, Dennis, 2013. "Eficacia y asimetrías de los programas de delación en un contexto multi-mercado: un análisis del caso colombiano en el marco del TLC con Estados Unidos [Efficacy and asymmetries of the leniency pro," MPRA Paper 48699, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  31. Evgenia Motchenkova & Rob Laan, 2011. "Strictness of leniency programs and asymmetric punishment effect," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 58(4), pages 401-431, December.
  32. Leslie M. Marx & Claudio Mezzetti & Robert C. Marshall, 2015. "Antitrust Leniency with Multiproduct Colluders," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 205-240, August.
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