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The Consequences for a Monopolistic Insurance Firm of Evaluating Risk Better than Customers: The Adverse Selection Hypothesis Reversed

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Deryugina, Tatyana, 2012. "Does Selection in Insurance Markets Always Favor Buyers?," MPRA Paper 53583, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  3. Renaud Bourlès & Anastasia Cozarenco & Dominique Henriet & Xavier Joutard, 2022. "Business Training with a Better-Informed Lender: Theory and Evidence from Microcredit in France," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 148, pages 65-108.
  4. Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, "undated". "Remedies for Sick Insurance," Working Papers 620, Barcelona School of Economics.
  5. Pau Olivella & Fred Schroyen, 2014. "Multidimensional Screening in a Monopolistic Insurance Market," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 39(1), pages 90-130, March.
  6. Bruno Jullien & Bernard Salanié & François Salanié, 2000. "Screening Risk-Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard," Working Papers 2000-41, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  7. Philippe Donder & Jean Hindriks, 2009. "Adverse selection, moral hazard and propitious selection," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 73-86, February.
  8. Renaud Bourlès & Anastasia Cozarenco & Dominique Henriet & Xavier Joutard, 2015. "Business Training Allocation and Credit Scoring: Theory and Evidence from Microcredit in France," Working Papers CEB 15-030, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  9. Pierre‐André Chiappori & Bruno Jullien & Bernard Salanié & François Salanié, 2006. "Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable implications," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(4), pages 783-798, December.
  10. S. Hun Seog, 2009. "Insurance Markets With Differential Information," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(2), pages 279-294, June.
  11. Koufopoulos, Kostas, 2002. "Asymmetric information, heterogeneity in risk perceptions and insurance: an explanation to a puzzle," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24906, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  12. Casper H. de Jong, 2021. "Risk classification and the balance of information in insurance; an alternative interpretation of the evidence," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 24(4), pages 445-461, December.
  13. Eberhard Feess & Cathrin Jordan & Ilan Noy, 2022. "Insurance for Catastrophes - Indemnity vs. Parametric Insurance with Imperfect Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 9631, CESifo.
  14. Kostas Koufopoulos, 2002. "Asymmetric Information, Heterogeneity in Risk Perceptions and Insurance: An Explanation to a Puzzle," FMG Discussion Papers dp402, Financial Markets Group.
  15. Renaud Bourlès & Anastasia Cozarenco & Dominique Henriet & Xavier Joutard, 2015. "Business Training Allocation and Credit Scoring: Theory and Evidence from Microcredit in France," AMSE Working Papers 1526, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
  16. Plisson, Manuel, 2009. "Assurabilité et développement de l'assurance dépendance," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/5064 edited by Lorenzi, Jean-Hervé.
  17. de la Rosa, Leonidas Enrique, 2011. "Overconfidence and moral hazard," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 429-451.
  18. Arthur Snow, 2015. "Monopolistic Insurance and the Value of Information," Risks, MDPI, vol. 3(3), pages 1-13, July.
  19. Laura Abrardi & Luca Colombo & Piero Tedeschi, 2019. "The Gains of Ignoring Risk: Insurance with Better Informed Principals," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza def084, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  20. Yann Braouezec, 2015. "Public versus Private Insurance System with (and without) Transaction Costs: Optimal Segmentation Policy of an Informed monopolistPublic versus Private Insurance System with (and without) Transaction ," Working Papers 2013-ECO-23, IESEG School of Management, revised May 2014.
  21. Dionne, Georges & Fombaron, Nathalie & Doherty, Neil, 2012. "Adverse selection in insurance contracting," Working Papers 12-8, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
  22. Michel-Kerjan Erwann & de Marcellis-Warin Nathalie, 2006. "Public-Private Programs for Covering Extreme Events: The Impact of Information Distribution on Risk-Sharing," Asia-Pacific Journal of Risk and Insurance, De Gruyter, vol. 1(2), pages 1-30, February.
  23. Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, 2003. "Private Information and its Effect on Market Equilibrium: New Evidence from Long-Term Care Insurance," NBER Working Papers 9957, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  24. Wu, T.C. Michael & Yang, C.C., 2012. "The welfare effect of income tax deductions for losses as insurance: Insured- versus insurer-sided adverse selection," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 2641-2645.
  25. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5358 is not listed on IDEAS
  26. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5356 is not listed on IDEAS
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