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How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Kang, Chang-Mo & Kim, Donghyun, 2022. "Risk management transparency and compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
  2. Gabaix, Xavier & Edmans, Alex, 2010. "Risk and the CEO Market: Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOs?," CEPR Discussion Papers 7836, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  3. Al Dah, Bilal & Dah, Mustafa A. & Stathopoulos, Konstantinos, 2026. "Rookie directors and board efficacy," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
  4. Chesney, Marc & Stromberg, Jacob & Wagner, Alexander F. & Wolff, Vincent, 2020. "Managerial incentives to take asset risk," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
  5. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix & Tomasz Sadzik & Yuliy Sannikov, 2009. "Dynamic Incentive Accounts," NBER Working Papers 15324, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Wu, Duowen & Zhang, Xueying & Zhang, Ge & Han, Liangliang, 2025. "Management equity incentives and bond credit spread: Evidence from China," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
  7. Yin, Chao & Liu, Peibiao, 2025. "Executive compensation incentives, consumer green preferences, and corporate risk," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(PG).
  8. Liu, Xinyu & Gao, Shuanping & Tong, Lijing & Li, Jiyuan, 2025. "Multiple large shareholders and pay-performance sensitivity: Evidence from China," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 73(PA).
  9. Liljeblom, Eva & Pasternack, Daniel & Rosenberg, Matts, 2011. "What determines stock option contract design?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 293-316.
  10. Pierre Chaigneau, 2012. "The Effect of Risk Preferences on the Valuation and Incentives of Compensation Contracts," Cahiers de recherche 1209, CIRPEE.
  11. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2013. "Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 4-23.
  12. Hai Van Le & Dulce Lopez Cruz, 2024. "CEO compensation and risk taking: S&P 1500 firms," Business Economics, Palgrave Macmillan;National Association for Business Economics, vol. 59(4), pages 235-242, October.
  13. Koharki, Kevin & Watson, Luke, 2025. "Risk-taking incentives and firm credit risk11The authors thank Kristine W. Hankins (editor), the anonymous associate editor and two anonymous reviewers, workshop participants at Lehigh University, Northwestern University, Southern Methodist Universit," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
  14. Karpavičius, Sigitas & Yu, Fan, 2018. "The impact of dividend-protected CEO equity incentives on firm value and risk," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 16-24.
  15. Dunbar, Craig & Li, Zhichuan (Frank) & Shi, Yaqi, 2020. "CEO risk-taking incentives and corporate social responsibility," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
  16. Weixiu Li & Bo Li, 2023. "Intellectual Property Pledge Financing and Enterprise Innovation: Based on the Perspective of Signal Incentive," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(13), pages 1-21, July.
  17. Ingolf Dittmann & Ernst Maug & Oliver Spalt, 2010. "Sticks or Carrots? Optimal CEO Compensation when Managers Are Loss Averse," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(6), pages 2015-2050, December.
  18. Humphery-Jenner, Mark & Islam, Emdad & Nanda, Vikram & Rahman, Lubna, 2025. "Incentive contracting in the shadow of litigation risk: Evidence from universal demand laws," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 171(C).
  19. Peter Slade & Tor Tolhurst, 2019. "Job Security and Risk‐Taking: Theory and Evidence From Professional Football," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 85(3), pages 899-918, January.
  20. Islam, Emdad & Rahman, Lubna, 2023. "Shades of grey: Risk-related agency conflicts and corporate innovation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
  21. Zu, Yafei & Ma, Chenmin & Sun, Qian, 2025. "Executive compensation stickiness, social trust and enterprise innovation," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3).
  22. Harris, Oneil & Glegg, Charmaine & Buckley, Winston, 2019. "Do co-opted boards enhance or reduce R&D productivity?," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
  23. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2013. "Risk-shifting and the regulation of bank CEOs’ compensation," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 778-789.
  24. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
  25. Bloomfield, Matthew J., 2021. "Compensation disclosures and strategic commitment: Evidence from revenue-based pay," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(2), pages 620-643.
  26. Chakraborti, Rajdeep & Dahiya, Sandeep & Ge, Lei & Gete, Pedro, 2024. "A model of managerial compensation, firm leverage and credit stimulus," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
  27. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2018. "The optimal timing of CEO compensation," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 90-94.
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